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The Varieties of Numerical Remedies
Eric Schnapper*
On July 2, 1986, the Supreme Court finally resolved a 17 year con-
troversy I regarding whether race conscious 2 numerical orders3 could
be utilized to enforce Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. In Local 28
of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. EEOC,4 six members
of the Court agreed that federal courts could in some instances issue
such orders, even if the beneficiaries of the decrees might not them-
selves be the actual victims of an employer's past discrimination. 5 In a
companion case, Local 93, International Association of Firefighters v. Cleve-
land,6 sixJustices held that a federal court could order into effect a con-
sent decree containing a race conscious numerical order even if that
court might have lacked the authority to impose that order on a non-
* Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; Lecturer in
Law, B.A., Johns Hopkins University, 1962; M.A.,, Johns Hopkins University 1963; B. Phil.,
Oxfor University, 1965; LL.B., Yale University, 1968. Columbia University.
1. The earliest appellate decision on this issue is United States v. Ironworkers Local 86,
443 F.2d 544, 551-54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
2. Although this article refers most often to remedial orders in race discrimination cases,
the issues involved are similar to those in cases involving discrimination on the basis of sex,
national origin, or other impermissible considerations. Because the basis for court-ordered
numerical relief is essentially practical, however, in any particular case such relief could well
be more appropriate for one group or position than for others. See, e.g., United States v. New
York, 475 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (N.D.N.Y. 1979). The practical and legal problems raised by
court-ordered numerical remedies are, in most circumstances, the same regardless of whether
the underlying claim is based on the fourteenth amendment or one of the civil rights laws; the
courts have treated constitutional and statutory lawsuits as raising essentially identical legal
issues, and this article does so as well.
3. The various types of orders that have been issued requiring that a particular number
or proportion of women or minorities be hired or promoted or laid off are all referred to in
this article, for simplicity, as numerical remedies. In the opinions discussed herein these or-
ders are at times called "numerical remedies," "goals," or "preferences," or are given no
name at all. Although there are clear differences in the stringency and flexibility of these
various orders, see text accompanying notes 160-276 infra, there is no generally accepted rule
of law or common usage dictating the particular circumstances that might separate, for exam-
ple, a "numerical remedy" from a "goal." In an attempt to capture the semantic high ground,
opponents of particular numerical remedies denounce them as "quotas," while proponents
insist the remedies are merely "goals." In that context, "quota" often means little more than
"a numerical remedy disfavored by the speaker." To suggest, as some judges and commenta-
tors have, that "goals" are permissible but "quotas" are not is to convey little of substance
absent an explanation of the author's personal definitions of those terms. This article deliber-
ately eschews this sort of vague but provocative terminology.
4. 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986).
5. Id. at 3024 (plurality opinion); id. at 3054 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 3062 (White,
J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor apparently acquiesced in this holding. Id. at 3057
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
6. 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
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consenting defendant. 7 The decisions in Sheet Metal Workers' and
Firefighters were consistent with the views of the lower courts, which had
uniformly agreed that race conscious numerical remedies were permis-
sible in a Title VII case.8
But neither Sheet Metal Workers' nor Firefighters established a defini-
tive standard for determining whether a numerical remedy may or must
be imposed in a particular case. Among the lower courts there has been
widespread judicial disagreement and confusion regarding when such
remedies should be imposed and what form particular remedies should
take. The district and circuit courts considering the propriety of nu-
merical remedies have regarded that dispute as presenting a single is-
sue of legal and constitutional principle, and those courts quickly
arrived at a consensus in favor of permitting such remedies. The deci-
sions about the propriety of using numerical remedies in any specific
case, on the other hand, have remained largely ad hoc in nature. Sev-
eral of the circuits that have endorsed numerical remedies in the ab-
stract have been quite critical of the use of such remedies in particular
cases. 9 A number of circuits, on the other hand, have generally af-
firmed such orders. 10 The standards to be applied in framing a numeri-
cal remedy, and in determining whether to impose one at all, have
varied from case to case in an apparently unpredictable manner. In one
particularly notable decision, a panel of the Second Circuit, recognizing
that previous decisions in that circuit had proposed conflicting stan-
dards, despaired of resolving that conflict, and instead remanded a nu-
7. Id. at 3072.
8. Id.; Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3037 n.28.
9. Since 1975, the District of Columbia Circuit has reversed or modified all lower court
remedies imposing numerical remedies. See Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1293-95 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (numerical order vacated and remanded for reconsideration and additional find-
ings), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985); McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 78-80 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (numerical order modified to eliminate interim goals); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d
257, 293-96 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (numerical remedy reversed).
The Fourth Circuit has reversed three of the four appeals involving such remedies. See
Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 498-99 (4th Cir. 1981) (numerical rem-
edy affirmed); Sledge v.J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 585 F.2d 625, 647-50 (4th Cir. 1978) (numer-
ical remedy reversed), cert. denied 440 U.S. 981 (1979); White v. Carolina Paperboard Corp.,
564 F.2d 1073, 1091-92 (4th Cir. 1977) (numerical remedy reversed); Patterson v. American
Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 273-75 (4th Cir.) (numerical remedy reversed), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 920 (1976).
Between 1975 and 1980 the Second Circuit overturned in whole or in part five of the six
numerical remedies it reviewed. See Guardians Ass'n of the N.Y. Police Dep't, Inc. v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1980) (numerical remedy reversed), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 940 (1981); Association Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of
Bridgeport, 594 F.2d 306, 312-14 (2d Cir. 1979) (numerical remedy vacated and remanded);
EEOC v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local 638, 565 F.2d 31, 34-36 (2d Cir. 1977) (nu-
merical remedy affirmed); EEOC v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local 638, 532 F.2d 821,
831-32 (2d Cir. 1976) (specific numerical remedies reversed); Kirkland v. New York State
Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 427-30 (2d Cir. 1975) (numerical remedy re-
versed). Since 1981, the Second Circuit has reviewed four court ordered numerical remedies
and upheld them all.
10. The First, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have upheld both the imposition and
terms of every court-ordered numerical remedy that was the subject of an appeal.
NUMERICAL REMEDIES
merical remedy case to the district court with a direction that the trial
judge announce his own views so that those ideas could be considered
in a subsequent appeal. 1
This article seeks to provide a coherent account of why the federal
courts have used numerical remedies and an analysis of the types of
cases in which they should do so. Part I describes the evolution of
court ordered numerical remedies in Title VII and other employment
cases and discusses the appellate courts' failure to establish any clear
standards for adopting and framing such remedies. Part II argues that
this lack of a coherent set of standards is due to a failure to recognize
that the lower courts have been utilizing numerical remedies in six
quite distinct types of cases, each with its own rationale. The analysis
delineates both the differing circumstances under which each of these
six types of numerical remedies is warranted and the differences in the
forms of such orders that are appropriate in each case. Part III urges
that the trial courts, in deciding whether to order or deny numerical
relief, should analyze more carefully the rationale and evidence on
which that proposed relief is based, and that, where this has occurred,
the appellate courts should subject such orders or denials only to the
limited scrutiny appropriate to other factually based determinations.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF NUMERICAL REMEDIES
The fashioning of a coherent set of principles for framing and using
numerical remedies must begin with an understanding of how and why
those remedies came into use. From the entry of the first such order,
just two years after the effective date of Title VII, this body ofjurispru-
dence has emerged as an essentially practical response to a recurring
set of problems. The decisions that have emerged have on the whole
been both substantially consistent and theoretically incoherent.
Existing case law regarding numerical remedies has two peculiar
and seemingly contradictory characteristics. First, despite the ongoing
public controversy about such orders, and the fact that a substantial
majority of the public appears to find these orders, at the least, distaste-
ful, the federal courts have unanimously held that such decrees may be
used as remedies in employment discrimination cases. Every circuit
that has decided that issue has reached the same conclusion. Mostjudi-
cial objections have been limited to the propriety of particular orders,
or to their necessity in specific cases. 12 Since the adoption of Title VII
only a handful of lower court judges have ever argued that such reme-
11. Association Against Discrimination in Employment, 594 F.2d at 313-14.
12. See Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 757, 762-63 (6th Cir. 1983) (numeri-
cal relief imposed in error because sufficient remedy in good faith recruitment of minority
faculty members and other remedial measures); McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 79-80 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (long-term goals allowable but specific affirmative action timetables unnecessary in
light of the sweeping changes in promotion practices and hiring goals already adopted);
Guardians Ass n of the N.I1 Police Dep't, Inc., 630 F.2d at 109-13 (absent showing of deliberate
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dies are absolutely forbidden no matter what the circumstances.13 Sec-
ond, despite eighteen years of litigation concerning numerical remedies
in employment cases, the case law regarding when such remedies may
or should be used remains quite confused. The same judges who have
repeatedly agreed that numerical remedies are proper under some cir-
cumstances have been unable to reach any meaningful consensus about
what those circumstances are.
This situation is quite unlike the pattern of decisions in most other
areas of legal controversy. Ordinarily in such matters a clear difference
of opinion about some fundamental issue will emerge and be resolved
by a court of appeals en banc or by the Supreme Court, and the princi-
ples established in that appellate decision will then be administered in a
fairly coherent and predictable manner. In the early years of Title VII
litigation, for example, there was a sharp dispute about whether the
statute forbade practices that, although not adopted for a discrimina-
tory purpose, had a discriminatory effect on minorities. 14 The
Supreme Court resolved that dispute in 1971, holding in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. 15 that a Title VII action could be based on such a discrimina-
tory effect. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, 16 together with
guidelines issued by several federal agencies, 17 have further refined
and clarified the principles announced in Griggs. These developments
are typical of Title VII jurisprudence, which in most instances has be-
come increasingly clear and predictable during the same period that
decisions regarding numerical remedies have become steadily more
confused.
This judicial confusion has arisen because court ordered numerical
remedies have come into use, not as a result of any appellate decision
interpreting Title VII to require such orders, but because federal trial
judges under a wide variety of circumstances have found that some
form of numerical order was necessary, as a practical matter, to prevent
intent to discriminate, use of numerical remedies unwarranted); Patterson, 535 F.2d at 274-75
(numerical hiring goal reversed because company's current hiring practices sufficient).
13. Patterson, 535 F.2d at 276-77 (WidenerJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 634-39 (2d Cir. 1974) (Hays,J.,
dissenting); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1061-64 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (Coleman, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 332 (8th Cir.
1971) (en banc) (Van Oosterhout, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Carson v.
American Brands, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 780, 787-88 (E.D. Va. 1977), appeal dismissed, 606 F.2d
420 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 79 (1981).
14. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1232-34 (4th Cir. 1970) (discrimi-
natory purpose required), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) with United Paperworkers Local 189 v.
United States, 416 F.2d 980, 992-95 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970) (discrimi-
natory purpose not required if system carries past discrimination into the present) and United
States v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 139-40 (8th Cir. 1969)
(discriminatory purpose not required).
15. 401 U.S. 424, 429-33 (1971).
16. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
17. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 5 C.F.R. § 300.103(1)
(1986).
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or deter future acts of discrimination or to redress discrimination that
had already occurred. The emergence of numerical remedies has not
been a matter of statutory construction, except insofar as courts have
concluded that neither Title VII nor the fourteenth amendment pre-
cludes such remedies, but has resembled the evolution of equity reme-
dies in the early centuries of English law. During the first two decades
of Title VII litigation, judges required to frame remedial injunctions
have quite properly been primarily concerned with the peculiar circum-
stances of the particular violations before them. The fashioning of any
numerical order, like the framing of the other portions of these de-
crees, has necessarily been dictated largely by intensely practical
considerations.
It is hardly surprising that neither trial nor appellate judges have
found in either Title VII or the fourteenth amendment any substantial
guidance for fashioning such remedies. No member of Congress in
1964, or 1866, could have anticipated the remedial problems that
would arise in the 1970s and 1980s, and none seriously attempted to do
so. The Congress that framed Tide VII knew from bitter experience
the unusually difficult and complex problems that a court might well
face in preventing and redressing class-wide racial discrimination. In-
transigent Southern election officials had been extraordinarily success-
ful in denying blacks the right to vote guaranteed by the fifteenth
amendment and federal statutes, 18 and a decade after Brown v. Board of
Education 19 the federal courts were still struggling to find some form of
decree that would result in effective desegregation and undo the all too
enduring effects of past discriminatory practices. 20 Against that back-
ground, the Eighty-eighth Congress sensibly neither prescribed any
18. The well known history of discrimination in registration was summarized by the
Supreme Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 311-13 (1966). The voting
rights provisions of both the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 634, and the Civil Rights Act of
1960, 74 Stat. 86, had proved insufficient. The various tactics used by southern registrars to
disenfranchise blacks were discussed at length during the hearings that led to the adoption of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). In explaining the voting rights provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, seven members of the House Judiciary Committee noted "the
intricate methods employed by some state or county voting officials to defeat Negro registra-
tion." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 5 (1963). The Congress that framed
Title VII also had before it a report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights describ-
ing those tactics. U.S. CoIMi. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING (1961).
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. This basic problem was stated in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 13 (1971):
Over the 16 years since Brown II, many difficulties were encountered in implementa-
tion of the basic constitutional requirement that the State not discriminate between
public school children on the basis of their race. Nothing in our national experience
prior to 1955 prepared anyone for dealing with changes and adjustments of the mag-
nitude and complexity encountered since then. Deliberate resistance of some to the
Court's mandates has impeded the good-faith efforts of others to bring school sys-
tems into compliance. The detail and nature of those dilatory tactics has been noted
frequently by this Court and other courts.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was adopted, in part, to overcome the continued
resistance to Brown. Several members of the House Judiciary Committee, in a statement of
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particular remedial formula, nor withdrew from the arsenal of possible
remedies any weapon that later experience might prove essential. In
extraordinarily broad language, section 7 06 (g) authorized federal
judges to "order such affirmative action ... as the court deems appro-
priate. ' ' 21 That mandate, to do whatever might be necessary to enforce
the law, was sensibly construed by Sheet Metal Workers' to permit the use
of numerical remedies where appropriate, 22 yet it is a legislative man-
date that, virtually by definition, provides no guidance as to when such
remedies might be proper.
Had the adoption of Title VII been followed by prompt and uniform
compliance with the law, the subsequent dispute about hiring and pro-
motion remedies might well never have arisen. The public accommoda-
tions provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act were widely and quickly
obeyed; because restaurants and hotels, with only rare exceptions, ad-
mitted minorities immediately following the passage of the 1964 Act,
no court ever ordered quota dining or quota lodging. The response of
employers and unions to Title VII, unfortunately, was in many in-
stances very different. Many employers and unions, of course, did begin
to change their practices following the adoption of Title VII. But other,
more intransigent employers and unions embarked upon a program of
disobedience and dissembling that rivaled the tactics of the most vehe-
ment proponents of white supremacy. 23
A substantial majority of all court-ordered numerical remedies have
been imposed in cases in which blacks, other minorities, or women
were virtually excluded from the jobs at issue despite the passage of
Title VII. In over a quarter of the reported cases there was not a single
supplemental views included in the report on the 1964 Act, emphasized the magnitude and
success of that resistance:
[T]here are almost as many segregated school districts in late 1963 as there were at
the end of 1959 .... [A]t this pace, it will still take until the year 2063 before the
compliance order of the 1955 Supreme Court decision which called for school deseg-
regation in biracial school districts "with all deliberate speed" will be carried out....
During the past decade vigorous opposition to desegregation has led to legal meas-
ures aimed at restricting and circumventing the mandate of the Brown decision. The
various legal attempts to avoid the consequences of desegregation can be divided
into four major categories: (1) A number of Southern States have introduced one or
more of the multiple variables of the pre-Civil War doctrines of interposition and
nullification .... (2) Other states have entered upon a course of action aimed at
disqualifying potential plaintiffs . . . from bringing court actions to end segrega-
tion.... (3) A number of States have implemented pupil placement and assignment
laws which alter the theoretical basis of separation .... (4) The fourth category
comprises the various devices employed to separate the operation of the schools
from the state .... [T]he net result has been massive delay in implementing the
mandate of the Court.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 2, at 20-21 (1963).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
22. Sheet Metal Workers', 106 S. Ct. at 3034 (plurality opinion).
23. The lack of progress in ending employment discrimination was a major considera-
tion in the decision of Congress to strengthen Title VII in 1972. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5 (1971); S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-8 (1971).
856 [Vol. 39:851
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black or woman in the disputed job.24 This phenomenon was not lim-
ited to the days immediately following enactment of Title VII; well into
the 1970s and beyond the courts have continued to face all-white or all-
male unions,25 police departments, 26 fire departments, 27 and jobs or
units of other employers. 28 In another quarter of the reported cases,
the number of minorities or women remained at token levels, fre-
quently under 2 percent, in cities where the proportion of minorities or
women in the area workforce was often ten times higher.29 In a
number of instances the proportion of minorities on a defendant's
workforce was not only low, but actually declining. 30 Neither test had
24. There are a total of 89 court-ordered numerical remedies reported in volumes 1-35
of the Bureau of National Affairs, Fair Employment Practices Cases. This publication includes
all employment discrimination cases officially reported in the Federal Supplement and Fed-
eral Reporter, as well as a large number of decisions and orders not otherwise reported. Of
these decisions, 24 involved cases in which there were no blacks, women, or other minorities
in the position at issue. See E. Schnapper, List of Employment Discrimination Cases (1987)
(on file with the Stanford Law Review). The very first case in which a numerical remedy was
ordered under Title VII was such a case. See Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 368, 370
(E.D. La. 1967) (no blacks or Mexican-Americans), aff'd sub nom. International Ass'n of Heat
and Frost Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
25. See, e.g., EEOC v. Local 2P Lithographers Int'l Union, 412 F. Supp. 530, 534 (D. Md.
1976); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 10, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1036,
1039 (D.N.J. 1973).
26. See, e.g., United States v. San Diego County, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 402, 408
(S.D. Cal. 1979) (0% black deputy sheriffs; 0% Hispanic deputy sheriffs in 1977 and 1.3%
(one person) in 1979); see also NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 1974); Morrow v.
Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1055 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (no blacks at time of trial), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 895 (1974); Reed v. Lucas, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 153, 154 (E.D. Mich. 1975)
(no black deputy inspectors); Pennsylvania v. Sebastien, 368 F. Supp. 854, 855 (W.D. Pa.
1972), af'd, 480 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1973).
27. See, e.g., Association Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of Bridgeport,
479 F. Supp. 101, 105, (D. Conn. 1979) (in 1975 department had 427 whites, no blacks, one
Hispanic), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 641 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988
(1982); Arnold v. Ballard, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 287, 288 (N.D. Ohio 1973); see also
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 323 (8th Cir. 1971).
28. See, e.g., Bentley v. City of Thomaston, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1476, 1478
(M.D. Ga. 1983) (35 of 68 city job classifications had never been held by a black; 12 of the
remaining 33 had only had one black); Thompson v. Boyle, 499 F. Supp. 1147, 1149 (D.D.C.
1979) (all supervisors and all craft bookbinders were male; 98% of all craftsmen were male);
Sherrill v.J.P. Stevens & Co., 410 F. Supp. 770, 775-77 (W.D.N.C. 1975) (no blacks in office,
clerical or supervisory positions; no blacks in shop or maintenance positions until 1974), aft'd,
551 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1977); Ostapowicz v.Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 397 (3d Cir.
1976) (no women ever served as first class machine operators), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041
(1977); Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 795, 801 (W.D. Ky. 1973)
(no women hired prior to 1973).
29. See, e.g., United States v. City of Philadelphia, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1560,
1562 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (women 1.6% of police department); Patterson v. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co., 659 F.2d 736 (7th Cir. 1979) (union 1.3% black), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1100 (1981);
United States v. New York, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1286, 1314 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (state
police less than 1% black in 1978); Abron v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 654 F.2d 951 (4th Cir.
1981) (blacks less than 1% of craftsmen, office, and clerical workers); Davis v. County of Los
Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir. 1977), (blacks and Hispanics together only 3.3.% of
firemen), vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625 (1978); see also note 27 supra.
30. See, e.g., Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 588 F.2d 235, 240
(8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 904 (1979); United States v. City of Chicago, 411 F. Supp.
218, 230 (N.D. Il. 1976), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977); United
857
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
been, or could be, validated as job related. In such extreme situations
stern measures were clearly required; no sensible judge could have
concluded that a union or employer that had remained in brazen viola-
tion of Title VII for years would change its ways merely because of a
general injunction reiterating the long disregarded statutory prohibi-
tion against discrimination. 31 Where trial judges familiar with all the
circumstances of these cases concluded that numerical remedies were
among the necessary remedial measures, the appellate courts were un-
derstandably and properly reluctant to substitute their own judgments.
In a substantial number of the cases in which numerical relief was
ordered, the order occurred only after, and because, earlier racially
neutral decrees had been violated by the defendants. In November,
1969, for example, a Lathers Union local in New York City agreed to a
consent decree which forbade racial discrimination, established a de-
tailed, racially neutral procedure for making referrals to new jobs, and
required the union to develop fair and objective standards for selecting
new members. Eighteen months later the district judge who had ap-
proved the decree found that the union had continued to engage in
wholesale discrimination, disregarded and circumvented the referral
procedure established by the decree, proposed membership standards
that were "trivial and superficial," and violated the decree in a number
of other respects. 32 The trial court consequently held the union in
contempt and ordered into effect a numerical provision for issuing
union work permits.33 Similar situations occurred in Chicago, 34
States v. Bricklayers Local 1, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 863, 867 (W.D. Tenn. 1973);
Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 431 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
Despite Title VII's restriction on the use of testing procedures with an adverse effect on
protected groups, several cities used tests that excluded 100 percent of female or minority
applicants. See Association Against Discrimination in Employment, 479 F. Supp. at 108-09; Ballard, 6
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 288; see also Pennsylvania v. Flaherty, 477 F. Supp. 1263, 1265
(W.D. Pa. 1979) (as a result of test, pool of applicants ranking high enough for promotions to
lieutenant was 100% white); Berkman v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp, 177, 186 (E.D.N.Y.
1982), aft'd, 705 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1983). Neither test had been, or could be, validated as job
related.
31. In ordering or approving numerical remedies, judges have repeatedly insisted that it
would be insufficient to issue an injunction which merely reiterated the non-discrimination
requirement of Title VII or the Constitution. See, e.g., Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters
Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 631 (2d Cir. 1974) (district court properly granted "more drastic
relief than a mere prohibition against future discriminatory conduct"); United States v. Inter-
national Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 38, 428 F.2d 144, 151 (6th Cir.) (district court injunction
lacking numerical remedy criticized as a "pro forma" judgment), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943
(1970); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 132 n.18
(8th Cir. 1969) (quoting International Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators, 407 F.2d at 1051-52
(district court not limited to "simply parroting the Act's prohibitions")).
32. United States v. Lathers Local 46, 328 F. Supp. 429, 431-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
33. United States v. Lathers Local 46, 341 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 471 F.2d
408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); see also EEOC v. Local 638, 401 F. Supp. 467,
488-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (numerous violations of prior decree), modified, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1976), aff'd sub nom. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019
(1986).
34. In 1976, following the issuance of a preliminary injunction against discrimination on
the basis of sex, the Chicago Police Department took a series of steps that, in the words of the
[Vol. 39:851
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Bridgeport,3 5 and St. Louis.3 6 In a number of instances courts which
initially ordered only flexible hiring or promotion goals later found that
the defendant employers abused the discretion accorded by those de-
crees and continued in their old ways, forcing the courts to impose
more stringent remedies.3 7 In Sheet Metal Workers' itself the district
court grounded its decision to use a numerical remedy on the fact that
the defendant had repeatedly violated a series of federal and state court
orders.38s
The practical inadequacy of nonnumerical decrees was not limited
to cases in which the defendants brazenly violated the injunction. In a
substantial number of instances the effects of past discriminatory prac-
tices were so severe and enduring that even a racially neutral hiring or
promotion procedure was as discriminatory as the invidious policies it
replaced. The most celebrated cases of this type were NAACP v. Allen s9
trial judge, "exacerbated the situation": administering a test whose results were not used,
adopting new requirements that created "an almost impossible hurdle for women," and con-
tinuing to refuse to promote any female officers. United States v. City of Chicago, 411 F.
Supp. at 230-31.
35. The Bridgeport Fire Department, which as recently as 1975 had no black officers in a
city that was 16 percent black, drafted a plan to correct that situation, but refused to adopt the
plan until threatened with a termination of all federal assistance, and then after adoption
made no effort to comply with its own plan. Association Against Discrimination in Employment, 479
F. Supp. at 101; cf STATISTICAL ABsTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 22 (1986) (noting minority
population of Bridgeport).
36. St. Louis, following decisions or acknowledgements that the procedures used for
making promotions were illegal under Title VII, avoided promoting any minorities by the
simple expedient of refusing to make any further promotions and declining to adopt new
lawful procedures. Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality, 588 F.2d at 240; Western Addition Com-
munity Org. v. Alioto, 369 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 514 F.2d 542 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975); see also Guardians Ass'n of N.Y. Police Dep't v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 484 F. Supp. 785, 798 (new unlawful test adopted after earlier test declared illegal),
aff'd in part and vacated in part, 630 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981);
EEOC v. AT&T, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 390, 421 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (consent decree
numerical provision justified by violation of prior decree).
37. See Clayton v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 996,
997 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (consent decree extended for 5 years; 2 year deadline established for
achieving 15% minority employment level); EEOC v. Bartenders, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1575, 1577 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (minimum minority levels of membership in union in-
creased from 10% Asian-American and 8% Black to 14.7% Asian-American and 12% Black);
Morgan v. O'Bryant, 671 F.2d 23, 24 (Ist Cir.) (50% hiring order changed to require suffi-
cient minority hiring to increase minority staff proportion by 1.5% each year), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 881 (1982); Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551, 556 n.4 (6th Cir. 1981) (in face of contempt
motion for violation of prior decree disavowing numerical remedies but requiring recruiting
efforts to increase fire department employment of minorities to population proportion, de-
fendant agreed to new consent decree specifying number of minority firefighters to be hired
each year from 1977 through 1983); United States v. San Diego County, 21 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 402, 404-05 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (following violation of decree requiring the defend-
ant "to seek to achieve the interim goal" of promoting minorities and women at a rate twice
their proportion in the relevant pool, court ordered that specified number of minorities and
women must be given next promotions); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 621 F.
Supp. 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (numerical order extended to temporary promotions to prevent
evasion of order regarding permanent promotions).
38. 106 S. Ct. at 3027.
39. 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
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and Morrow v. Crisler,40 both decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1974. The
facts of these cases were remarkably similar. In July 1970, a federal
court in NAACP v. Allen 4 t had enjoined the State of Alabama from con-
tinuing to discriminate against blacks in hiring state troopers. That or-
der also established detailed nonnumerical provisions for assuring an
end to discrimination, including stringent controls on the civil service
certification procedure, an end to all segregation of employee facilities,
mandatory announcements in all public advertisements of a nondis-
criminatory hiring policy, and an extensive program of recruitment of
minority job applicants. 4 2 Nineteen months later, the district judge
found that not a single black had been hired as state trooper or into the
civilian positions connected with the troopers.4 3
In Morrow,44 a different federal judge issued a similarly explicit non-
numerical injunction intended to end discrimination in the all-white
Mississippi Highway Patrol.45 In April, 1973, the first appellate panel
40. 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974). An earlier panel
decision in Morrow upholding the trial court's denial of numerical relief is reported at 479
F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1973).
41. The original order was part of a broader injunction regarding Alabama civil service
appointments entered in United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ala. 1970). The
trial court in Allen considered the request for a numerical order in that case as a motion for
further relief in Frazer. NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705 (M.D. Ala. 1972) aft'd, 493 F.2d
614 (5th Cir. 1974). For simplicity, all these proceedings are referred to as NAACP v. Allen,
the name by which the case was known in the court of appeals.
42. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. at 1091-93. The recruiting portions of paragraph VII of that
decree provided:
(2) The defendants shall advise the public in all advertisements and announcements
that they will appoint and employ persons on an equal opportunity, merit basis, with-
out discrimination on the ground of race or color.... (3) The defendants shall
adopt and implement a program of recruitment and advertising which will fully ad-
vise the Negro citizens of the State of Alabama of the employment opportunities
available to them with the State of Alabama agencies. This program shall include a
rearrangement of regular places for administering merit system examinations so that
at least 25 percent of those places consist of predominantly Negro high schools or
other institutions. The defendants shall also revise their permanent mailing list of
the State Personnel Department to include all predominantly Negro educational in-
stitutions and vocational schools, and radio and television stations and newspapers;
and for positions in which a high school education or less is required, the defendants
shall be required to mail announcements of such positions, together with other re-
lated materials, to all the institutions indicated above, as well as to predominantly
Negro high schools. (4) The defendants shall institute regular recruitment visits to
predominantly Negro high schools, business and vocational schools, and colleges
and universities throughout the State of Alabama.
Id. at 1093. This is precisely the sort of decree which the Department ofJustice now insists
simply could not fail.
43. Allen, 340 F. Supp. at 705.
44. 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 674 (S.D. Miss. 1971), aff'd, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974).
45. The Morrow decree, entered in October 1971, forbade the use of non-job-related
tests, required desegregation of all employee facilities, prohibited special treatment for appli-
cants who were friends or relatives of existing officers, banned the use of recruiting films
showing only white patrolmen, mandated radio, newspaper, and television advertisements an-
nouncing a nondiscriminatory policy, and required "recruitment efforts to be made at as
many predominately black colleges, junior colleges, and high schools within the state as
nearly feasible and practicable." 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 674-76.
860
NUMERICAL REMEDIES
to consider a challenge to the adequacy of that order insisted that the
decree should be given a chance to prove its effectiveness:
There is no evidence that the enforced recruitment measures ordered
by the District Court will not be sufficient to assure all interested mem-
bers of the minority class that they will be hired by the Department, if
qualified. There is no evidence that the present qualifications need be
changed in order to open the doors to black applicants .... Time may
prove that the District Court was wrong, i.e., that the relief ordered was
not sufficient to achieve a nondiscriminatory system and eliminate the
effects of past discrimination. But until the affirmative relief the District
Court has ordered has been given a chance to work, we cannot tell.
There is no way that this Court can determine that the relief the Court
ordered will not achieve the remedy to which the plaintiffs are
entitled.4 6
When Morrow was decided by the Fifth Circuit, en banc, however, the
court of appeals concluded that the district court had in fact been
wrong, emphasizing that during the two years the decree had been in
effect only six blacks had been hired onto the Highway Patrol.4 7
Neither the district court decision in Allen nor the appellate deci-
sions in Allen and Morrow asserted that the defendants had violated the
nonnumerical decrees that had originally been entered; these decisions
concluded, rather, that the decrees involved, even if obeyed, were inca-
pable of ending the pattern of discrimination. 48 In other cases, courts
that initially denied numerical relief found that lesser methods subse-
quently proved inadequate. 49 The history of these cases necessarily af-
fected the attitudes of judges in other litigation. Practical experience
had demonstrated that in a significant number of instances a general
injunction forbidding discrimination, or an order establishing flexible
goals and timetables, simply would not be obeyed. Subsequent viola-
tions could be detected, and provide a basis for harsher measures, but
during the intervening years the defendants remained in violation of
both the law and the earlier decree. Even if obeyed, detailed decrees of
the type used in Allen and Morrow often proved ineffective. Faced with
what were often longstanding violations of Title VII or the Constitu-
tion, judges were understandably reluctant to risk further postponing
the implementation of an effective remedy while they experimented
with a mild decree of a type that had demonstrably failed in past cases.
It seems likely that the type of jobs at issue in most of the cases in
which numerical remedies were sought has affected the willingness of
46. 479 F.2d at 964.
47. Morrow, 491 F.2d at 1055.
48. Id. at 1055-56; Allen, 493 F.2d at 621.
49. EEOC v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 636, 565 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1977) (numerical
order justified by "the long litigation history", which included an earlier decree which had
had little effect), aff'd sub nom. Sheetmetal Workers' Local 28 v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986);
Chmill v. City of Pittsburgh, 14 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 62, 64 (Pa. C.P. 1976) (prior
federal decree requiring new examinations and recruitment of minorities unsuccessful), rev'd,
31 Pa. Commw. 98, 375 A.2d 841 (1977), rev'd, 488 Pa. 470, 412 A.2d 860 (1980).
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courts to impose such remedies. Much of the opposition to affirmative
action has focused on positions, such as college faculty appointments,
where the abilities of the applicants vary enormously and, to a signifi-
cant degree, measurably. But none of the numerical remedy cases has
involved such jobs. Approximately one-quarter of all such orders were
imposed in cases involving membership in, or referrals by, craft un-
ions. 50 In most of these cases the issue was how to select unskilled
applicants for admission to an apprenticeship program. Few Americans
may be able to teach Russian syntax, even with the best of education,
but a substantial majority of the-population can be trained to lay
bricks5 ' or mix drinks. 5 2 About 40 percent of all numerical remedies
were utilized in police and fire department cases.55 There was some
initial suggestion that critical differences of ability were at stake here;
Judge Coleman, in a dissenting opinion in Morrow, warned darkly that it
would be "too late to weep when some under-educated, subnormally
intelligent individual, white or black, armed with deadly weapons, un-
justifiably launches a human being into eternity. . . ,,54 But such re-
marks are not to be found in the dissents in later quota cases. Even
Judge Coleman acknowledged that there was an adequate supply of
well-qualified blacks to staff the Mississippi Highway Patrol.55 A large
portion of the police and fire department cases involved successful
challenges to job relatedness of hiring or promotion standards. 5 6 The
50. Of the 89 numerical orders reported in volumes 1 through 35 of Fair Empl. Prac.
Cases, 25 involved police departments, 20 craft unions, and 13 fire departments. Five cases
concerned discrimination in layoffs of previously hired public school teachers. Most of the
remaining orders were framed to correct discrimination in the hiring or assignment of blue
collar workers. Among numerical orders reviewed on appeal, the reversal rate was lower for
orders involving unions (10%) police (12%), firefighters (14%) and teacher layoffs (17%)
than for other positions (42%). See E. Schnapper supra note 24 (listing all cases). The earliest
decisions in the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits upholding numerical reme-
dies all involved discrimination by craft unions. United States v. International Bhd. Elec.
Workers Local 212, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Lathers Local 46,471 F.2d
408 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. Carpenters Local 169,
457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Int'l Ass'n Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407
F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Bricklayers, Local 1, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 863
(W.D. Tenn. 1972).
52. See, e.g., EEOC v. Bartenders, Local 41, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1575 (N.D.
Cal. 1979).
53. See notes 26-27, 29 supra; notes 267-268 infra. The earliest appellate decisions ap-
proving court ordered numerical remedies in the First, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits
involved either police or fire departments. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973)
(fire); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (police); Castro v.
Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) (police); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.
1971) (fire), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
54. Morrow, 491 F.2d at 1062.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 588 F.2d 235, 237
(8th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 443 U.S. 904 (1979); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d
1334, 1337-47 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625 (1978); United States v. City of
Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 428-29 (7th Cir. 1977); Bridgeport Guardians v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
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liability findings in such litigation demonstrated, ipso facto, that the de-
fendant officials either did not know how to identify the better qualified
applicants, or that the qualifications of those applicants were so similar
that the use of an essentially arbitrary test posed no threat to the quality
of the workforce. On such a record, and in the light of a series of such
cases, federal judges were likely to view with justified skepticism pleas
that numerical remedies were unfair to "better qualified" applicants.5 7
The manner in which numerical remedies have been approved and
imposed reflects the intensely practical concerns underlying that judi-
cial action. The appellate courts have never treated such orders as an
ordinary or routine remedy, as they do back pay58 or counsel fees. 59
On the contrary, the courts of appeals have repeatedly insisted that nu-
merical remedies, although among the remedial devices in the chancel-
lor's arsenal,60 are to be imposed only when necessary or as a last
resort-not, of course, last in the sense that all possible alternatives
must be tried first, but last in the sense that nonnumerical alternatives
must be considered and are to be preferred. Thus, although there are
more than a score of cases in which a numerical order imposed by a
trial court was overturned or limited on appeal,61 there is not a single
reported instance in which an appellate court, on reviewing the same
record that was before a trial judge who had denied numerical relief,
held that the denial of that relief was erroneous. 62 Even in Morrow,
482 F.2d 1333, 1335 (2d Cir. 1973); O'Neill, 473 F.2d at 1030-31; Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d
at 733-36.
57. In NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, (5th Cir. 1974), the court reasoned:
[N]o applicant for public employment can base any claim of right under the Four-
teenth Amendment's equal protection or due process clauses upon an eligibility
ranking which results from unvalidated selection procedures that have been shown
to disqualify blacks at a disproportionate rate. This is so because by definition such
criteria have not been shown to be predictive of successful job performance. Hence,
there is no reliable way to know that any accepted applicant is truly better qualified
than others who may have been rejected. Until the selection procedures used by the
defendants here have been properly validated, it is illogical to argue that quota hir-
ing produces unconstitutional 'reverse' discrimination, or a lowering of employment
standards, or the appointment of less or unqualified persons.
Id at 618; see also Carter, 452 F.2d at 331 .
58. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413-25 (1975).
59. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983);
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
60. See note 8 supra.
61. See note 9 supra.
62. In two instances, in addition to Morrow, appellate courts have required "affirmative
relief" on remand, but in both these cases the final decision whether to use a numerical rem-
edy was left to the trial judge. United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918,
943-45 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. International Bhd. Elec. Workers Local 38, 428 F.2d
144, 151-52 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); see also Wells v. Meyer's Bakery, 561
F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir. 1977) (appellant's request that Eighth Circuit order numerical rem-
edy denied, but district court on remand to "fashion whatever affirmative remedy deemed
necessary to eliminate all vestiges of discrimination. . ."). In the two reported cases in which
numerical remedies were ordered in the first instance by a court of appeals, the trial court had
earlier denied relief because it mistakenly believed that there was no violation of the law to
remedy. Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 355, 362-64
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where subsequent events convinced the Fifth Circuit that the original
nonnumerical decree had failed, the court of appeals declined to order
a numerical remedy itself, but left the fashioning of further relief to the
district court. 63 In a number of instances where the appellate courts
have had doubts about the propriety of a numerical order attacked on
appeal, they have remanded the case for additional findings and pro-
ceedings, rather than attempt to make their own judgment on the
matter.64
The use of numerical remedies by district courts has on the whole
been similarly sensitive and selective. Requests for numerical orders
have been denied where the trial courts thought them unnecessary. 65
Because of the difficulty of predicting the efficacy of nonnumerical rem-
edies, those denials have frequently been accompanied by an admoni-
tion that a numerical order would be imposed later if necessary. 66 The
same district judges who have granted such remedies in one case have
denied them in others. 67 The practice and attitude of district judges
(8th Cir. 1980) (district court had denied preliminary injunction because it found plaintiffs
had not established a likelihood of success on the merits); United States v. N.L. Indus., 479
F.2d 354, 358, 377 (8th Cir. 1973) (district court had found no discrimination). The unwill-
ingness of the Eighth Circuit in these two cases to remand the framing of a remedy to the trial
judge may have stemmed from the fact that in both cases the trial judges' earlier opinions had
been reversed once before, and appellate court's earlier decisions did not appear to have been
adhered to on remand. See 479 F.2d at 358 n.2.
63. Morrow, 491 F.2d at 1056.
64. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1294-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115
(1985); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 291-95 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. City of
Buffalo, 633 F.2d 643, 648-49 (2d Cir. 1980); Association Against Discrimination in Employ-
ment v. City of Bridgeport, 594 F.2d 306, 312 (2d Cir. 1980); Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze
Co., 541 F.2d 394, 402 (3d Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Rios v. Enterprise
Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1975).
65. Trout v. Hidalgo, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 281 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 702 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1983), vacated, 465 U.S. 1056 (1984); Williams v. Owens-
Illinois, 665 F.2d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982); United States v.
County of Fairfax, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 662, 671 (E.D. Va. 1981); Dawson v. Pas-
trick, 441 F. Supp. 133, 142 (N.D. Ind. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 600 F.2d 70 (7th
Cir. 1979); United States v. County of Fairfax, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 753, 760 (E.D.
Va. 1979), vacated, 629 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981); Miller v.
Continental Can Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1585, 1603 (S.D. Ga. 1976), laterproceed-
ing, 544 F. Supp. 210 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
66. Sledge v.J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625, 649-650 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 981 (1979); EEOC v. Riss Int'l, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 430, 432 (W.D. Mo.
1982); Dawson, 441 F. Supp. at 143; Morrow v. Dillard, 412 F. Supp. 494, 502 (S.D. Miss.
1976), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 580 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1978); Miller v. Continental Can
Co., 13 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1603;Jordan v. Wright, 417 F. Supp. 42, 45-46 (M.D.
Ala. 1976); Pennsylvania v. Glickman, 370 F. Supp. 724, 737 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Wade v. Missis-
sippi Coop. Extension Serv., 372 F. Supp. 126, 146 (N.D. Miss. 1974); Hogue v. Bach, 5 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 754, 757 (D. Colo. 1972); United States v. Operating Eng'rs Local 3,
4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1088, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
67. Compare EEOC v. Riss Int'l, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 432 (Sachs, C.J.; nu-
merical remedy denied) with EEOC v. Cook Paint & Varnish, Co., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 437, 440-42 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (Sachs, CJ.) (numerical remedy granted); compare Jordan,
417 F. Supp. at 45-46 (Johnson, C.J.) (numerical remedy denied) with NAACP v. Allen, 340 F.
Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (Johnson, CJ.) (numerical remedy granted), aft'd, 493 F.2d 614
(5th Cir. 1974); compare Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187, 1213 (D. Md. 1973)
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was aptly described by one judge in 1975 when, in explaining his deci-
sion to award such a remedy, he found that "in this case ... it appears
to be the only possible means of relief for racial discrimination," and
emphasized that numerical "relief is an unusual and extraordinary rem-
edy and does not automatically follow from the finding of any kind of
discrimination. ' 68 Notwithstanding the perceived practical necessity
for numerical remedies in certain cases, judicial sanction for such relief
was not a foregone conclusion. The use of such remedies has at times
been as personally distasteful to judges as it is to many members of the
public. 69
Many of the same circumstances that led to a judicial consensus in
favor of the permissibility of numerical remedies also contributed to
the present confusion about when such remedies should be used. For
years the employers, unions, and white intervenors who objected to nu-
merical remedies argued only that such injunctions were always and
necessarily impermissible as a matter of law. 70 In some instances liti-
gants probably declined to criticize the scope of the order at issue be-
cause they objected as much to admitting or hiring a single minority
member as they did to accepting a larger number. More often the anti-
quota argument seemed to acquire such a momentum of its own that
litigants found themselves fighting for a cause that could not be com-
(Young, DJ.; numerical remedy denied), aff'd sub. nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th
Cir. 1973) with Abron v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 439 F. Supp. 1095, 1117 (D. Md. 1977)
(Young, DJ.; numerical remedy granted); compare Thornton v. East Texas Motor Freight, 7
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1239, 1243 (W.D. Tenn. 1973) (Wellford, D.J.; numerical remedy
denied), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 497 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1973) with United States Bricklay-
ers Local 1, 5 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 863, 882 (W.D. Tenn. 1973) (Wellford, DJ.; nu-
merical remedy granted), modified sub. nom. United States v. Masonry Contractors Ass'n, 497
F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1974); compare Pennsylvania v. Glickman, 370 F. Supp. at 734-38 (Teitel-
baum, DJ.; numerical remedy denied) with Pennsylvania v. Sebastien, 368 F. Supp. 854, 856
(W.D. Pa. 1972) (Teitelbaum, DJ.; numerical remedy granted), aft'd, 480 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.
1973). Orders granting or denying numerical remedies in a particular case have frequently
been modified in light of subsequent events. Compare Western Addition Community Org. v.
Alioto, 369 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (numerical remedy granted) with 360 F. Supp 733,
739.40 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (numerical remedy denied).
68. Crockett v. Green, 388 F. Supp. 912, 921 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
69. See, e.g., Taylor v.Jones, 495 F. Supp. 1285, 1296 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
70. EEOC v. Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors Local 5, 538 F.2d 1012, 1019 (3d Cir.
1976) (rejecting argument that numerical remedies are prohibited by sections 703() and
703(h) of Title VII); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 273-74 (4th Cir. 1976)
(rejecting argument that numerical remedies are prohibited by section 703(j)), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 920 (1976); Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767, 772 n.3 (2d
Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976); Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504
F.2d 1017, 1027-28 (1st Cir. 1974) (same), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); Rios v. Enterprise
Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 630-31 (2d Cir. 1974) (rejecting argument nu-
merical remedies are prohibited by section 7030)); United States v. Lathers Local 46, 471
F.2d 408, 412-13 (2d Cir. 1973) (same), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v.
Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 552-53 (9th Cir. 1971) (same), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984
(1971); EEOC v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 1022, 1044-56 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (rejecting argument that
numerical remedies are prohibited by sections 703(a), 703(h) and 703() of Title VII, Execu-
tive Order 11246, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Constitution), aff'd, 556 F.2d 167
(3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
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promised by suggesting the existence of any intermediate position. De-
fendants have declined to respond to evidence offered in support of
requests for proposed numerical orders71 while others have declined to
attack the fact-finding on which such orders were based.72 In Allen, for
example, the Alabama Department of Public Safety objected strenu-
ously to the district court order imposing a 1:1 hiring ratio until 25
percent of the state troopers were black, but did not suggest that either
the hiring ratio or cut-off percentage was too high.
In many of the early situations the facts were so extreme that the
courts saw little need to articulate a theory as to why numerical reme-
dies, if permissible as a matter of law, were warranted in that particular
case. If numerical remedies were ever justified, they were surely justi-
fied in Morrow and Allen; the resolution of such appeals thus did not
require a detailed analysis of the standards that might be applied in
later, harder cases. The breadth of the oft-quoted passage from Louisi-
ana v. United States calling for the eradication of the effects of past dis-
crimination 73 provided a firm foundation for utilizing numerical orders,
but also afforded almost no guidance as to when they should be used.
A requirement that discrimination and its effects be ended was easy to
apply in Allen and Morrow, since either discrimination or its effects were
obviously present. There was little need in such cases to analyze pre-
cisely what those effects were, or how discrimination might have contin-
ued in the face of the earlier detailed decrees. Almost any theory for
numerical remedies was likely to be applicable to a case in which there
were still no minority employees at all. In justifying a numerical order
for a city fire department which as late as 1975 had not a single black
member, a district court, directed by the Second Circuit to explain that
decree,74 recounted half a dozen different possible justifications for
such relief and found them all applicable. 75 When harder cases began
71. United States v. Lathers Local 46, 341 F. Supp. 694, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("The
Apprenticeship Committee, which had tossed out a suggestion that there should be a 'hear-
ing' on some 'facts' proposed no concrete occasion for any such hearing. The union did not
make or press the suggestion."), af'd, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973);
Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084, 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modified, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d
Cir. 1973):
Unfortunately, the defense of this case to date has been characterized by overreac-
tion at the emotional level, and underreaction at the rational, practical level. The
raw statistics, and the probable results of plaintiffs' statistical studies, have been
known for more than a year. The defendants have made no independent studies of
their own.
72. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1974).
73. 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965) ("[The Court has not merely the power but the duty to
render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as
well as bar like discrimination in the future.").
74. Association Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of Bridgeport, 594 F.2d
306, 310-11 (2d Cir. 1979).
75. Association Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.
Supp. 101 (D. Conn. 1979), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 647 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982). The district court concluded, inter alia, that a numerical remedy
was "necessary to redress 'a clear-cut pattern of long-continued and egregious racial discrimi-
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to arise, the propriety of numerical relief was so firmly established that
courts often did not bother to explain why that remedy was being pro-
vided under the particular circumstances at issue.
Lacking any guidance as to when, why, or in what form numerical
remedies are appropriate, the practices of lower courts have varied
enormously. The proportion of women and/or minorities to be hired
or promoted ranges from 1.7 percent to 100 percent,76 although al-
most half of all court-ordered numerical remedies are 50 percent, 77 ap-
parently because this was the first ratio used78 and is now the most
common figure. In other cases the proportion varied by job79 or by
year,80 or was simply described as whatever number proved necessary
to reach a particular employment level by a given date.8 The duration
of these orders has varied in even more complex ways. In the largest
number of cases the order continues until a particular proportion of the
workforce is reached, usually based on the area workforce in the re-
gion,8 2 or, in the case of supervisors, on the proportion of minorities or
nation,' " 479 F. Supp. at 112, that it was "particularly appropriate here because the city is a
public employer," id. at 113; and that a requirement of non-discrimination coupled with re-
cruitment of minorities "would be inadequate... 'to assure prospective minority candidates
that applying is no longer futile.' " Id
76. Berkman v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 177, 217 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (45 of 2,666
hires, or 1.7%), af'd, 705 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 35
Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 437, 442 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (33.3%); McKenzie v. Saylor, 508 F.
Supp. 641, 653 (D.D.C. 1981) (90%), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub. noma. McKenzie v.
Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis,
616 F.2d 350, 363 (8th Cir. 1980) (100% of next 8 vacancies, then 33%), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
938 (1981).
77. See, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 816, 819 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936
(1984); Bentley v. City of Thomaston, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1476, 1480 (M.D. Ga.
1983); Guardians Ass'n of N.Y. Police Dep't v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 484 F. Supp. 785, 799
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 630 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
940 (1981); Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 488 F. Supp.
988, 992 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aft'd, 648 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1981).
78. Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1051 (5th
Cir. 1969).
79. Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1805, 1810 (E.D.
Mich. 1978) (50% of supervisors, 66% of certain jobs); McKenzie, 508 F. Supp. at 653, 655
(80% and 90%); Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1157, 1165 (E.D.
Va. 1976) (33 1/3%, 60%, 66 1/3%).
80. Stamps, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1810 (30% by 1980); EEOC v. Bartenders
Int'l, 28 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1575, 1577 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (separate goals for each of
several six month periods); Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv., 516 F. Supp. 810, 883
(W.D.N.C. 1980) (different deadlines for each job), modified, 665 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1981);
Jones v. Milwaukee County, 441 F. Supp. 455, 457 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
81. Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 488 F. Supp. at
993.
82. Arthur, 712 F.2d at 817-18; Bentley, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1480; Taylor v.
Jones, 495 F. Supp. 1285, 1296 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (16% goal reflects "the labor pool of quali-
fied persons available"), modfied, 653 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. New York,
475 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (N.D.N.Y. 1979); see also Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 35 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 442 (order continues until workforce is 25% female, which is the average pro-
portion of applicants who are female); Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Oper-
ating Eng'rs, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 439-40 (proportion varies by population of
region).
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females in the subordinate positions from which the supervisors are
chosen.8 3 Other orders are to remain in effect until the creation of ob-
jective hiring standards,8 4 the fashioning of a valid test,8 5 the hiring or
promotion of a particular number of minority or female employees, 86
the passing of a given number of years,8 7 the exhaustion of a particular
pool of minorities or women,8 8 or further order of the court.8 9 Only
occasionally do trial courts offer an account of how they determined the
numerical order's level or duration. Because the circumstances of
these cases diverge widely, it is not possible to say that the decrees are
necessarily inconsistent with one another, but the differences are none-
theless unexplained.
The confusion among the appellate courts regarding the circum-
stances under which numerical orders may be imposed is equally appar-
ent. The ten circuits that have spoken on the issue have among them
established no fewer than a dozen different criteria for deciding
whether a court should order numerical relief, standards which would
presumably also be relevant to determining the form and duration of
such relief. Not one of these criteria is recognized as relevant in all ten
circuits, and many are sanctioned in only a few. Six circuits hold that
the use of a numerical remedy must be "necessary." 90 A different
group of six circuits attach importance to the degree of egregiousness
83. Chisholm, 516 F. Supp. at 883; Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional
Servs., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 36, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), af'd in part and rev'd in part, 520
F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
84. Heat & Frost Insulators, 407 F.2d at 1055; Eubanks v. Pickens-Bond Gonstr. Co., 24
Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 892, 895 (E.D. Ark. 1979), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 635 F.2d
1341 (8th Cir. 1980).
85. Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality, 588 F.2d at 237-38; Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 13 Fair
EmpI. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1468, 1474 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aft'd, 530 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 921 (1976); Kirkland, I1 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 37.
86. Firefighters Inst., 616 F.2d at 363-64; Association Against Discrimination in Employ-
ment v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F. Supp. 101, 114-16 (D. Conn. 1979), aff'd in part and vacated
in part, 641 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982).
87. Louisville Black Police Officers Org., v. City of Louisville, 511 F. Supp. 825, 840
(W.D. Ky. 1979), aff'd, 700 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1983).
88. Association Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of Bridgeport, 17 Fair
Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1308, 1314 (D. Conn. 1978) (all qualified 1975 minority applicants),
order vacated, 594 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1979); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
304, 305 (D. Mass. 1974), aff'd, 509 F.2d 599 (1st Cir. 1975); Western Addition Community
Org. v. Alioto, 369 F. Supp. 77, 81 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aft'd, 514 F.2d 542 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1014 (1975).
89. United States v. New York, 475 F. Supp. at 1111; United States v. City of Chicago,
411 F. Supp. 218, 242 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); see also United States v. City of Philadelphia, 28 Fair
Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1560, 1562 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (order limited to one entering class of
police cadets); Segar v. Smith, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 935, 938 (D.D.C. 1982) (order
continues for 5 years or until position 10% black, whichever is sooner), aff'd in part and vacated
in part, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
90. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1294 (alternatives must be considered); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd.
of Educ., 706 F.2d 757, 763-64 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. County of Fairfax, 629 F.2d
932, 942 (4th Cir. 1980) (numerical order proper "only in the most extraordinary circum-
stances and where there is a compelling need"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981); United
States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d at 437; Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional
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of the earlier discriminatory practices. 91 Another group of six circuits
accords the trial court some degree of discretion in framing any numer-
ical remedy.9 2 Four circuits take into consideration any voluntary action
taken by the employer to remedy past violations, 9 3 and three circuits
hold that numerical remedies are more permissible if they are short in
duration.94 A variety of other considerations command support in only
one or two circuits. 9 5 Within a single circuit the list of officially sanc-
tioned standards often varies from opinion to opinion.
9 6
Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 427 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124
(1976); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (5th Cir. 1974).
91. Berkman v. City of New York, 705 F.2d 584, 596 (2d Cir. 1983); Williams v. Vuko-
vich, 720 F.2d 909, 924 (6th Cir. 1983); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 294 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (numerical orders may be appropriate for "a dilatory or obstructive employer");
Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 499 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918, 943-45 (10th Cir. 1979); NAACP v. Allen, 493
F.2d at 620-22; Erie Human Relations Comm'n v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371, 375 n.7 (3d Cir.
1974).
92. Berkman, 705 F.2d at 594; Chisholm, 665 F.2d at 498; Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d
1284, 1295 n.13 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d at 436; Davis v.
County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1342-44 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625
(1979); Morgan, 509 F.2d at 600-01; Tullio, 493 F.2d at 374. AsJudge Goldberg noted in his
dissent in Morrow v. Crisler, 479 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974), these cases have generally involved challenges to the
scope of a numerical remedy, not to a decision to deny such a remedy entirely:
The deference that was being paid on appeal-rejecting claims that the relief had
been too extensive-was that the precise contours of affirmative relief are best left to
the district court. They should not be read as holding that the question of affirmative
relief vel non is purely a matter of district court discretion.
*.. As we have only too often experienced in cases of racial discrimination, the
nature of the remedy is often the only relevant substantive issue at stake, and to
permit broad notions of "discretion" to supplant our duty to insure effective relief is
an unfortunate abdication.
Id at 972 (citations omitted).
93. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1294; Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d at 943-44; Sledge v.J.P.
Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625, 647 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979); Rios v.
Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 636-32 (2d Cir. 1974).
94. Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1564 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc);
Thompson, 678 F.2d at 294; United States v. City of Buffalo, 633 F.2d 643, 647 (2d Cir. 1980);
Ostapowicz v.Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 402 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1041 (1977), reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1979).
95. Thompson, 678 F.2d at 294-95 (preference for numerical order with less harsh impact
on whites; order to "target the numerical remedy specifically at the discrimination to be
brought to an end"); Association Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of
Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256, 281 (2d Cir. 1981) (use of numerical order to be made in a "gin-
gerly" manner). Second Circuit decisions adhere to a rule, not applied elsewhere, that nu-
merical remedies may not adversely affect a small number of identifiable whites; in practice
this appears to preclude the use of numerical remedies in most promotion cases. See, e.g., id.
at 283-84; EEOC v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local 638, 532 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir.
1976), aff'd sub non. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019
(1986); Kirkland, 520 F.2d at 427, 429. But see Association Against Discrimination in Employ-
ment v. City of Bridgeport, 594 F.2d 306, 310 (2d Cir. 1979). Justice O'Connor endorsed
consideration of this particular criterion in her dissenting opinion in Sheet Metal Workers" hIt'I
Ass'n Local 638, 106 S.Ct. at 3061.
96. See Berkmnan, 705 F.2d at 594-96 (distinguishing three types of numerical remedies);
Association Against Discrimination in Employment, 647 F.2d at 280-83 (numerical remedy appropri-
ate only if (1) long standing discrimination, (2) egregious discrimination, and (3) no harm to a
small number of identifiable whites); City of Buffalo, 633 F.2d at 647 (numerical remedy appro-
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Even when a number of circuits agree on the relevance of a particu-
lar factor, there are often fundamental differences regarding how that
factor is to be applied. Thus while many circuits agree that court-or-
dered numerical remedies may not be imposed unless necessary, this
nominal consensus in fact masks a critical dispute about how likely it
must be that non-numerical alternatives would prove insufficient. The
Fifth Circuit in Morrow divided on precisely that issue. The majority of
the original panel in Morrow initially upheld the denial of a numerical
remedy because there was at least a possibility that the non-numerical
relief that had been granted might succeed, emphasizing that there was
"no showing" 97 that the relief awarded would prove inadequate, and
that "[t]here is no way that this Court can determine" that that relief
would prove insufficient. 98 The court of appeals, sitting en banc, con-
cluded that the plaintiffs should not have been required to run the risk
that a possibly inefficacious injunction might fail, and insisted that the
trial court "fashion an appropriate decree which will have the certain
result of increasing the number of blacks on the Highway Patrol." 99
Subsequent Fifth Circuit decisions have reiterated this requirement of
certainty of success, thus limiting the authority of trial judges to experi-
ment with non-numerical remedies whose adequacy is a matter of spec-
ulation.' 00 In other circuits, however, the requirements of "necessity"
and "compelling need" seem to suggest that numerical remedies can-
not be utilized unless it is certain that the available alternatives will
fail.10' In the District of Columbia, trial courts are required to examine
such alternatives before ordering a numerical remedy, although the
standard to be applied in that examination is unclear.'0 2 Because of
the difficulty in predicting the efficacy of a non-numerical decree, the
propriety of numerical relief will often turn on whether the plaintiff or
priate only if (1) long-standing discrimination, (2) significant impact on minority employment
levels, and (3) numerical remedy is as short term as possible); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1980) (numerical remedy appropriate only if(l) inten-
tional discrimination, or (2) a pattern of significant prior discrimination or "flagrant dispar-
ity" in employment levels), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981).
97. 479 F.2d 960, 964 (5th Cir. 1973), aft'd, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974).
98. Id.
99. 491 F.2d at 1055.
100. United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1336 (5th Cir. 1980) ("affirmative
relief is required to ensure that the effects of past discrimination are eliminated") (emphasis in
original), modified, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d at 617
("feasible, workable, effective.. .and promise realistically to work and to work now").
101. See note 90 supra.
102. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115
(1985). District court decisions regarding the presence or absence of necessity are often quite
summary. Compare Taylor v.Jones, 495 F. Supp. 1285, 1296 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (necessity pres-
ent), modified, 653 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1981) and Erie Human Relations Comm'n v. Tullio, 360
F. Supp. 628, 629 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (necessity present), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 493
F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1974) with Western Addition Community Org. v. Alioto, 360 F. Supp. 733,
739 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (necessity not present) and Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp.
1187, 1214 (D. Md.) (necessity not present), modfied, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973).
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the defendant bears the burden of proof, an issue which most courts
demanding necessity simply have not addressed squarely.
Other apparent agreements among the circuits are often equally su-
perficial. Virtually all the decisions citing the existence of district court
discretion are in opinions affirming trial court decisions to order or
deny numerical relief;10 3 appellate opinions reversing such trial court
orders rarely mention that discretion. Voluntary affirmative efforts
seem to be a virtual bar to numerical relief in the Fourth Circuit,' 0 4 but
numerical remedies have been ordered despite such activities by the
Sixth' 0 5 and Seventh 10 6 Circuits, and the Ninth Circuit will accept in
place of a numerical order only affirmative action that is demonstrably
as effective as that order would be. 10 7 The level of past discrimination
relevant to the imposition of numerical relief is measured, variously, by
the extent to which minorities or women have been excluded from the
jobs at issue,' 08 by the egregiousness of the violation,'0 9 by the length
of time during which discrimination persisted 10 and by the recalci-
trance I ' of the defendants. This last criterion might seem to limit nu-
merical remedies to instances of intentional violations of the law, but
such a restriction has been rejected by every circuit that has expressly
considered it.112 Several circuits that favor numerical remedies of short
duration also prefer numerical orders in which the proportion or
number of minorities or women to be hired or promoted is relatively
low." 3 These two standards are ordinarily quite inconsistent; where,
103. See note 92 supra.
104. Sledge v.J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625, 644-50 (4th Cir. 1978), held that the
district court in that case had erred in issuing a numerical hiring order since minority hiring
had risen prior to trial, although this increase was due in part to the fact that whites no longer
wanted the low paying jobs at issue. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 259, 272-
74 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976), held that the same pattern of promotions which
proved intentional discrimination also demonstrated the existence of sufficient affirmative ac-
tion to preclude the use of numerical remedies. Both of these appellate decisions appear to
be unwarranted by the facts of the cases involved.
105. United States v. Int'l Bhd. Elec. Workers Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
106. United States v. Local 520, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 476 F.2d 1201, 1203-
04 (7th Cir. 1973).
107. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1343-44 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as
moot, 440 U.S. 625 (1979).
108. Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 924 (6th Cir. 1983); Erie Human Relations
Comm'n v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371, 375 n.7 (3d Cir. 1974).
109. Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 1983) ("egregious");
McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (defendant "especially dilatory");
Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 499 (4th Cir. 1981) ("egregious, purpo-
sive or blatant").
110. Berkman v. City of New York, 705 F.2d 584, 596 (2d Cir. 1983); Chisholm, 665 F.2d
at 499; Association Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of New York, 647 F.2d 256,
281 (2d Cir. 1981) ("long-continued"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982).
111. United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight Co., 625 F.2d 918, 944 n.18 (10th Cir.
1979).
112. NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1027-28 (Ist Cir. 1974); Tullio, 493 F.2d at 373-
74.
113. Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1564 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc);
April 1987]
STANFORD LA W REVIEW
as is often the case, the purpose of the order is to bring about the hiring
or promotion of a particular total number of individuals, an order with
a lower ratio will of necessity last longer, and a decree can only be
shortened in duration by making it more stringent in substance. These
circuits also regard the egregiousness of the past discrimination as sup-
porting a numerical remedy,1 14 but the more complete the past exclu-
sion of women or minorities, the more severe or long 'lasting the
remedy will have to be.
Appellate opinions that identify the considerations relevant to the
framing and imposition of a numerical remedy rarely provide substan-
tial guidance as to how any particular standard is applied. Decisions
declaring the degree of past discrimination to be relevant, for example,
do not provide any indication of how much past discrimination is
enough to justify a numerical remedy, or what degree of past discrimi-
nation dictates what type of order. Similarly, the appellate decisions
provide little if any indication of how to balance the multiple considera-
tions, such as how much recent affirmative action could cancel out a
particular level of past discrimination that would otherwise warrant a
numerical order. These problems do not, of course, have any simple
mechanical solution. But no criterion can be intelligently weighed,
and no set of competing factors can be balanced, unless there is a co-
herent understanding of why that criterion or those factors are
relevant.
This present state of the law is more than merely theoretically inele-
gant. If, as all appellate courts agree, there are circumstances in which
numerical remedies are both appropriate and necessary remedial tools,
then the absence of standards for the application of such remedies is an
open invitation to abuse by a judge who opposes such relief regardless
of its necessity. During the late 1970s for example, although the Sec-
ond Circuit had repeatedly upheld the legality of numerical remedies,
Judges Hays115 and Feinberg' 16 made clear that they disagreed with
that holding and took part in a series of decisions reversing or vacating
most of the numerical orders that came before the court.1 17 Similarly,
Judge Dortch Warriner of the Eastern District of Virginia has distin-
Tullio, 493 F.2d at 374-75; Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1341 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975).
114. See note 91 supra.
115. Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 634-39 (2d Cir.
1974) (Hays, J, dissenting).
116. Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767, 775-76 (2d Cir.
1975) (Feinberg, J., concurring), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976).
117. United States v. City of Buffalo, 633 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1980) (Feinberg, J., partici-
pating); Association Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of Bridgeport, 594 F.2d
306, 310-11 (2d Cir. 1979) (Feinberg, J.); EEOC v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local
638, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976) (Feinberg, J., concurring), aff'd sub nor. Local 28 of Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't
of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 427-30 (2d Cir. 1975) (Hays, J., participating), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
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guished himself by adamantly refusing to approve any consent decree
that contained a numerical remedy. After his first such decision, hold-
ing numerical remedies illegal per se, was reversed by the Fourth Cir-
cuit,1 18 Judge Warriner found all subsequent numerical provisions
impermissible in their particulars. 19
Fifteen years ago, when many Title VII defendants had virtually no
minority employees, the lack of a coherent account of the purpose of
numerical remedies was of little moment. If numerical remedies were
permissible at all, as every appellate court held that they were, that
remedy was surely permissible in such extreme circumstances; in such
cases the result was likely to be essentially the same regardless of what
rationale or standards were adopted. But as the cases in which numeri-
cal orders were sought came to involve less egregious violations of the
law, the lack of an agreed-upon rationale and set of standards made
judicial dissension inevitable.' 20 That emerging problem is starkly il-
lustrated by the history of numerical remedies in the Fifth Circuit. That
circuit was in 1969 the very first court of appeals to approve court or-
dered numerical relief in an employment case,121 and its 1974 en banc
decision in Morrow v. Crisler122 is perhaps the strongest illustration of
the practical need for such remedies. Between 1969 and 1981 the cir-
cuit rejected every appellate challenge to such a remedy. 123 In 1984,
however, this veneer of consensus collapsed when the court was con-
fronted with a district court decision disapproving a numerical provi-
sion in a consent decree that had been proposed to settle an
employment discrimination suit against the New Orleans police depart-
ment.' 2 4 Unlike the all-white Mississippi and Alabama highway patrols
of a decade earlier, the New Orleans police department was already
over 20 percent black.' 25 There was little evidence in the record of re-
cent intentional discrimination,' 26 and the city's mayor was black. The
118. Carson v. American Brands, 654 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1981), rev k 446 F. Supp. 780
(E.D. Va. 1977).
119. United States v. Sheriff of Lancaster, 561 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Va. 1983); United
States v. Virginia, 554 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Va. 1983).
120. The first instance in which appellate judges disagreed about the propriety of a par-
ticular numerical order was Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc),
affirming a numerical hiring order. The city police force that was the subject of that action
was 18% black. Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084, 1087 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
121. Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53, v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.
1969).
122. 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1975).
123. Phillips v.Joint Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), cert. de-
nied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1980);
Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1978); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir.
1974); Baker v. Columbus Mun. Separate School Dist., 462 F.2d 1112, (5th Cir. 1972); see also
notes 121-122 supra.
124. Williams v. City of New Orleans, 543 F. Supp. 662, revd, 694 F.2d 987 (5th Cir.),
rev'd on reheanng, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 763 F.2d 667 (5th
Cir. 1985).
125. Williams, 543 F. Supp. at 673.
126. Id. at 673-74.
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trial judge approved almost all portions of the proposed 33-page de-
cree, including a number of race-conscious provisions, and rejected the
disputed numerical promotion order only after an evidentiary hear-
ing.' 27 In the resulting appeal no majority could be found in the Fifth
Circuit for any single view of the purpose of numerical remedies or the
propriety of the proposed decree. Six judges, including two of the
original Morrow majority, thought numerical relief proper in a wide va-
riety of circumstances, including those of the New Orleans case.128
Four other judges, including one of the Morrow dissenters, concluded
that, while numerical remedies might be permissible under some nar-
row circumstances as a "last resort," the New Orleans promotion order
was unlawful. Their view, like the opinions of Judges Hays and Fein-
berg in the Second Circuit, was openly based on a candidly expressed
opposition to all numerical remedies.' 29 The deciding votes in the New
Orleans case were cast by three judges who, after recounting a number
of the more frequently announced standards for deciding whether to
order numerical relief, announced that the issue was a matter for the
discretion of the trial judge.'3 0 Faced with a complex case that is
doubtless typical of the litigation of the years ahead, the circuit that had
been the first, most frequent, and most consistent defender of numeri-
cal remedies was unable to reach any conclusion as to when and how
they should be used in the future.
II. THE Six TYPES OF REMEDIAL NUMERICAL REMEDIES
With one notable exception, 13 1 the courts of appeals have endeav-
ored to articulate a single standard governing when, and in what form,
numerical remedies should be ordered. Were all numerical remedies
designed to resolve a single remedial problem, this endeavor would
long ago have achieved a reasonable degree of success. Repeatedly ad-
dressing the same situation, trial and appellate courts would have pro-
duced standards that steadily converged, and appellate disagreements
and reversals would have become increasingly uncommon.
In fact, however, no such convergence or agreement has emerged.
On the contrary, the more the appellate courts address this issue, the
more confused the law becomes. This has occurred, in large measure,
because trial courts are using numerical remedies for a number of very
distinct purposes to deal with quite different types of problems. A dec-
127. Id. at 681-84.
128. Williams, 729 F.2d at 1570-84 (Wisdom, J., concurring and dissenting).
129. Id. at 1565 (Gee, J., concurring); id., at 1565-70 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 1555-65 (plurality opinion).
131. Berkman v. City of New York, 705 F.2d 584, 595-96 (2d Cir. 1983). Berkman distin-
guished two types of numerical remedies, those intended to eliminate the discriminatory im-
pact of a non-job related selection procedure, and those intended to provide "affirmative
relief." The first type of order, which this article characterizes as a test-neutralization numeri-
cal remedy, is described at text accompanying notes 197-198 infra. Berknian 's second category
encompasses what are in fact a variety of different types of numerical remedies.
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ade ago, when the discriminatory practices under attack were particu-
larly extreme, several of those problems would frequently be present in
the same case. Where that was true the practical necessity for a numer-
ical remedy seemed particularly compelling, and a variety of possible
remedial theories all yielded the same result.13 2 In more recent years,
however, Title VII cases have often presented only one or two of those
remedial problems. Under these circumstances, a numerical order that
might seem justified by the circumstances of one case would not fit the
standard articulated in a separate case to deal with another quite differ-
ent problem, and the standards announced by appellate panels to ad-
dress the particular situations before them understandably varied from
case to case.
In Sheet Metal Workers' the Supreme Court also attempted to an-
nounce general principles that could be used in all cases to evaluate the
appropriateness of numerical relief. The plurality opinion suggested
that numerical remedies were warranted where they were necessary,
temporary, flexible, and did not unnecessarily trammel the interests of
whites.13 3 The shortcomings of this approach were illustrated by the
fact that among the three other Justices apparently adhering to such
broad standards, Justices O'Connor and White concluded that the or-
der at issue was improper, 134 and Justice Powell upheld the order in
that case only on an analysis rather different from the plurality's.' 3 5 In
the absence of a clear understanding of the purpose of a numerical or-
der, there is simply no way to evaluate whether a particular order is
necessary, whether the adverse impact on whites is unavoidable, or
whether the order is insufficiently or excessively flexible. Another por-
tion of the Sheet Metal Workers' plurality opinion, 136 however, one with
which Justice White "generally agree[d],"' 13 7 recognized the existence
of several quite distinct purposes which a numerical remedy might
serve.' 38 To fashion a coherent body of standards for analyzing pro-
posed numerical remedies, the courts must carefully distinguish among
the very different remedial problems which numerical orders may be
framed to solve.
A review of the experience of the lower courts reveals that numeri-
cal orders have been used to address six quite distinct remedial
problems. The analysis which follows attempts to articulate the ration-
132. In Association Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.
Supp. 101, 112-14 (D. Conn. 1979), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 647 F.2d 256 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982), the district court surveyed the wide variety of stan-
dards and rationales for numerical remedies and found them all applicable to the circum-
stances of that case.
133. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local 28, 106 S. Ct. at 3051-52.
134. Ia at 3057-62, (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id at 3062-63 (White, J., dissenting).
135. Id at 3054-57.
136. Id at 3036-37.
137. Id at 3062.
138. Id at 3036-37.
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ale for using the different numerical remedies in each of these six sepa-
rate situations, and to delineate the factors relevant to determining the
need for and appropriate scope and duration of each type of numerical
order. In some instances, such as test neutralization orders, the lower
courts have been fairly articulate in explaining the purpose and para-
meters of the remedies. In other cases, such as victim identification
orders, the nature of the underlying problem can be gleaned from re-
ported opinions, but there are few if any decisions which clearly recog-
nize the distinct rationale of the particular type of decree at issue.
A. Compliance Orders
The earliest remedial problem to emerge in Title VII litigation was
the need to frame a decree that would effectively end intentional dis-
crimination by a recalcitrant employer or union. The first reported nu-
merical remedy in a Title VII case was issued in 1967 against a
Louisiana local of the Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers
Union.1 39 Two years after the adoption of Title VII, that union still had
an avowed policy of refusing to admit blacks as members of the union;
although the union referred large numbers of nonmembers to vacan-
cies in the asbestos and insulating trade, it openly refused to refer any
blacks.' 40 The district court directed the union to establish objective,
racially neutral standards for admission to membership and, until that
was done, to give 50 percent of all referrals to black craftsmen.' 41
On appeal the union acknowledged both the illegality of its prac-
tices and the propriety of injunctive relief, but insisted that the injunc-
tion be limited to "an order prohibiting in forceful terms dis-
crimination on the basis of race." 142 In rejecting that contention, the
Fifth Circuit emphasized its concern that such a generalized injunction,
merely reiterating the requirements of Title VII, simply would not be
obeyed:
If Local 53 wishes to read a forceful prohibition against discrimination,
it need look no further than the Civil Rights Act itself.
.... [T]he District Court did no more than ensure that the injunc-
tion against further racial discrimination would be fairly administered.
Absent objective criteria regarding admissions . . . , covert subversion
of the purpose of the injunction could occur. The same administrative
reasons support alternating white and negro referrals, particularly in
view of the union business agent's testimony that "every now and
then" referral application forms tend to "run out." 143
A number of subsequent decisions expressly grounded the granting of
139. Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd sub. nom. Interna-
tional Ass'n Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
140. Id. at 370-71.
141. Heat & Frost Insulators, 407 F.2d at 1051.
142. Id. at 1051.
143. Id. at 1051, 1055.
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numerical relief on the need to assure that an injunction against contin-
ued discrimination is "not subverted by hostile administration."'
' 44
The Supreme Court expressly recognized in Sheet Metal Workers' that
this was one of the possible bases for a numerical remedy. The plural-
ity opinion reasoned:
In some instances ... it may be necessary to require the employer or
union to take affirmative steps to end discrimination [in order] effec-
tively to enforce Title VII. Where an employer or union has engaged
in particularly longstanding or egregious discrimination, an injunction
simply reiterating Title VII's prohibition against discrimination will
often prove useless and will only result in endless enforcement litiga-
tion. In such cases, requiring recalcitrant employers or unions to hire
and to admit qualified minorities roughly in proportion to the number
of qualified minorities in the work force145 may be the only effective
way to ensure the full enjoyment of the rights protected by Title
VII.146
Justice White indicated general agreement with this portion of the plu-
rality opinion, 147 and Justice Powell expressed the similar view that "in
cases involving particularly egregious conduct a District Court may
fairly conclude that an injunction alone is insufficient to remedy a
proven violation of Title VII.' 1 48
The practical reasons why numerical orders are at times necessary
to assure compliance with Title VII are readily apparent. In many areas
of the law it is relatively easy to determine whether a defendant is obey-
ing an injunction, and the issues raised by such a determination are
ordinarily far narrower than those raised in the original litigation.
Thus in an action to quiet title, an order that Smith convey a deed to
Blackacre is relatively easy to police and enforce. But where a court
orders an employee or union to refrain from engaging in racial discrim-
ination, a plaintiff can only prove that the decree has been violated if he
or she demonstrates that the defendant has continued to engage in un-
lawful discrimination after the entry of the decree. Thus a general in-
144. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86,443 F.2d 544, 553-54 (4th Cir. 1971) (quot-
ing Heat & Frost Insulators, 407 F.2d at 1055); United States v. Local 3, Int'l Union of Operat-
ing Eng'rs, 4 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1088, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (quoting Heat & Frost
Insulators, 407 F.2d at 1055); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp 703, 705-06, (M.D. Ala. 1972)
(relief necessary to end discrimination that permeated defendants' policies), aff'd, 493 F.2d
614 (5th Cir. 1974).
145. It is unclear whether this passage means that minorities should constitute such a
proportion of new hires, or that new hires should be made at a rate that would quickly bring
the employer's workforce or the union's membership up to the overall proportion of minori-
ties in the workforce. The order in Sheet Metal Workers'Int'l Ass 'n was something of a hybrid.
146. 106 S. Ct. at 3036. The plurality cited as examples of such compliance orders six
specific cases: Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Chisholm v. United
States Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 498-99 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918, 943-45 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. City of Chicago, 549
F.2d 415, 436-37 (7th Cir. 1977); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d
622, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1974), Allen, 340 F. Supp at 706.
147. 106 S. Ct. at 3062 (White, J., dissenting).
148. Id at 3054 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
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junction against discrimination confers upon a nominally successful
plaintiff no remedy other than the option of returning to court and
proving the occurrence of a fresh act of discrimination, a right the
plaintiff would have enjoyed even had the original action never been
brought or won. 149 A general injunction against discrimination thus
provides a defendant with little additional incentive to obey the anti-
discrimination statute or statutes that it has already violated.' 50 Recal-
citrant employers and unions have proven equally adept at continuing
to discriminate in the face of decrees that forbade specific discrimina-
tory practices and established new racially neutral procedures, but
stopped short of ordering a numerical remedy. Judicial experience
demonstrated that the complexities of employment practices afforded a
racist employer or union more opportunities for continued discrimina-
tion than a court could often anticipate and forbid, and that adjudicated
decrees, consent decrees, and voluntarily adopted affirmative action
plans were all vulnerable to such evasive tactics.
The lower courts understandably came to regard numerical orders
as a useful and at times essential method for ending such willful viola-
tions of the law. The litigation leading to a finding of past discrimina-
tion ordinarily provided a court with sufficient information to predict
the level of minority hiring or promotions that would occur in the ab-
sence of renewed discrimination. Rather than attempt to imagine and
forbid every conceivable discriminatory tactic that might be adopted,
and to monitor compliance by every personnel official, the courts sim-
ply ordered the defendants to hire or promote the number of minori-
ties that those courts believed would be hired or promoted if there
were no further discrimination. Thus where the evidence demon-
strated that an employer would, but for unlawful discrimination, hire
approximately 10 percent blacks, the court would require the employer
to hire that proportion of blacks.
Such a compliance order offers three decided advantages over the
other often unsuccessful types of injunctions. First, a compliance order
can deter a wide range of discriminatory practices, not by attempting to
enumerate them all, but by forbidding an effect-the hiring or promo-
tion of fewer than expected minorities-that would result from any type
of systematic discrimination. Second, a compliance order shifts from
the court and the plaintiff to the defendant the burden of identifying
149. Cf Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d at 944-45 (numerical remedy "a practical
measure which would prevent possible repetition of the long and arduous lawsuit with which
we are now involved and which continues.")
150. A personnel official who violated an injunction against discrimination might techni-
cally be subject to criminal prosecution for contempt. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982). This method
of enforcing injunctions against racial discrimination by election officials proved unavailing,
since juries simply refused to convict the responsible officials. The author has been unable to
identify a single instance in the twenty year history of Title VII in which criminal contempt
charges were brought against a defendant for violating an injunction.
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and correcting discriminatory practices or officials. 151 Third, a viola-
tion of a compliance order is far easier to detect and prove than a viola-
tion of, for example, a general injunction against discrimination.
Compliance orders do not preclude a defendant from seeking to justify
non-compliance, or from obtaining a modification, if, for example, suf-
ficient numbers of qualified minorities cannot be found.
A compliance order provides a remedy similar to that established by
Congress in section 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. 152 The Voting
Rights Act was adopted after Congress concluded that both general
and detailed injunctions had proved insufficient to end intentional dis-
crimination against minority voters. Section 5 placed on the covered
jurisdictions the burden of demonstrating that any proposed alteration
in election law would be non-discriminatory, thus "shift[ing] the advan-
tage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its vic-
tims." 153Just as section 5 does not absolutely forbid all deviations from
state election law as it stood in 1965, so too a compliance order does
not absolutely forbid any departure from the mandated percentage. In
both instances, rather, any such deviation is declared presumptively im-
permissible unless the responsible party can demonstrate an appropri-
ate justification.
The most renowned example of a compliance order is the Philadel-
phia Plan, adopted by the Labor Department in 1969 for federal con-
struction projects in the Philadelphia area, and subsequently used in
other areas of the country. Although minority groups constituted 30
percent of the construction workers in the Philadelphia region, they
were less than 1 percent of the members of six specific trades. After a
detailed investigation and public hearings, the Department determined
that this underrepresentation resulted from racial discrimination in
those trades. 154 Such employment discrimination at federally-funded
construction projects had been forbidden by Executive Order since
151. The threat of back pay liability serves a similar purpose. See Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
152. Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(c) (1982)).
153. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966). The Court's account of
the circumstances leading to the adoption of section 5 is similar to the reasons underlying use
of compliance orders:
[WI]hen favorable decisions have finally been obtained, some of the States affected
have merely switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the federal decrees or
have enacted difficult new tests designed to prolong the existing disparity between
white and Negro registration. Alternatively, certain local officials have defied and
evaded court orders or have simply closed their registration offices to freeze the vot-
ing rolls.
383 U.S. at 314 (footnotes omitted).
The Court went on to conclude that "Congress had reason to suppose that these States
might try similar maneuvers in the future in order to evade the remedies for voting discrimi-
nation contained in the Act itself. Under the compulsion of these unique circumstances, Con-
gress responded in a permissibly decisive manner." Id at 335.
154. See Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 854 (1971).
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1943.155 The Department concluded that this long-standing violation
required "special measures" to end discrimination, and ordered federal
contractors to establish employment goals ranging from approximately
7 percent in 1970 to about 22 percent in 1973.156 Because construc-
tion work involved generally short term, often seasonal employment,
with a new crew hired for each project, these were essentially hiring
goals for each year. The detailed regulations governing this program
spelled out what seems implicit in any compliance order, namely that
the obligation involved was not absolute, and that a contractor who
failed to meet a goal would be given "an opportunity to demonstrate
that he made every good faith effort" to do so.15 7 The Philadelphia
Plan and its progeny were upheld by the courts as necessary to end
intentional discrimination. 158
The central purpose of a compliance order is to protect individuals
who, but for that relief, would in the future be actual victims of unlaw-
ful discrimination. Rather than waiting until further discrimination has
occurred and then awarding back pay and corrective injunctive relief, a
court, by issuing a compliance order, prevents that discrimination from
occurring at all. This preemptive approach is clearly to be preferred
under Title VII, which was adopted to end discrimination, not to per-
mit discrimination to continue subject to occasional litigation and re-
dress. As a practical matter, this preemptive approach often serves the
interests of whites as well, since further discrimination will often lead to
corrective seniority relief that necessarily has an adverse effect on the
seniority rights of whites. 159
The specific purpose of compliance orders dictates the type of cir-
cumstance in which they should be used. Compliance orders are ap-
propriate where a court or agency determines that an employer or
union is likely to continue to engage in discrimination despite the issu-
ance of either a general or a detailed injunction against such discrimi-
nation. The existence of a pattern of egregious or long-standing
discrimination, pursued in the teeth of federal and state laws forbidding
employment discrimination, is relevant because, and to the extent that,
it indicates that the employer or union is unlikely to mend its ways
merely because the statutory prohibitions are supplemented by an in-
junction. Ordinarily, this rationale means that compliance orders
should be limited to cases of intentional discrimination, or to instances
155. See Exec. Order No. 9346, 3 C.F.R. 1280 (1938-1943).
156. See Contractors Ass'n, 311 F. Supp. at 1005.
157. Id. at 1006.
158. See Southern ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); Joyce v.
McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.NJ. 1970); cf Associated Gen. Contractors v. Altshuler, 490
F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community Col-
lege Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970); United
States v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
851 (1972).
159. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 774-77 (1976).
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in which an employer persistently disregarded the Title VII prohibition
against practices with a discriminatory effect. 160 Conversely, if an em-
ployer or union takes voluntary steps both to end its past discrimina-
tion and affirmatively to increase opportunities for minorities, that
effort would ordinarily indicate that the employer or union would obey
an injunction against discrimination. Where an employer or union has
already demonstrated its inclination to continue to engage in discrimi-
nation despite the applicable statutory prohibitions, the employer or
union involved ought ordinarily to bear the burden of establishing that
a remedy short of a compliance order will suffice to end those illegal
practices. Where a request for a compliance order is denied, that de-
nial should not be the end of the matter; the subsequent actions of the
employer or union should be closely monitored to assure that the non-
numerical decree indeed proves sufficient.
The proportion of minorities to be hired or promoted under a com-
pliance order must be based on a factual determination of the level of
minority hiring or promotions likely to occur in the absence of contin-
ued discrimination. Under various circumstances that figure might be
the proportion of minorities in the area workforce,' 61 the proportion of
minorities applying for the positions at issue, 162 or the proportion re-
sulting from a more complex calculation based on interest, qualifica-
tions and possible deterrent effects of past discrimination. 163 If, for
example, minorities constitute a higher proportion of an employer's
job applicants than of the area workforce, then the applicant propor-
160. See Guardians Ass'n of the N.Y. Police Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 630 F.2d
79, 109 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981).
161. The cases cited in this note and notes 162-165 infra involve efforts, in connection
with a variety of different types of numerical orders, to ascertain the level of promotions,
hirings or employment that would occur but for discrimination. Cases using area workforce
data include Association Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of Bridgeport, 647
F.2d 256, 286 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d
622, 632-633 (2d Cir. 1974)), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982).
162. See Louisville Black Police Officers Org. v. City of Louisville, 511 F. Supp. 825, 831-
32 (W.D. Ky. 1979), aff'd, 700 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1983).
163. See Berkman v. City of New York, 705 F.2d 584, 594-96 (2d Cir. 1983) (adjustment
for deterrence of candidates due to sex-discriminatory test); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d
257, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (adjustment required for probable degree of interest in position);
Taylor v.Jones, 495 F. Supp. 1285, 1296 (D. Ark. 1980), aff'd in relevant part, 653 F.2d 1193
(8th Cir. 1981) (long term goal adjusted in light of skills required); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530
F.2d 431, 433 (1st Cir. 1976) (no adjustment for skills since defendant did not prove adjust-
ment warranted); Drayton v. City of St. Petersburg, 477 F. Supp. 846, 857-58, (M.D. Fla.
1979) (adjustment for high school degree requirement); EEOC v. Local 14 Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs, 415 F. Supp. 1155, 1170-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (adjustment to exclude work-
ers with more than a high school education); Rios, 400 F. Supp. at 986-87 (adjustments for
census undercount of minorities; weighted adjustment based on proportion of actual steam
fitters with various levels of education); EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 401
F. Supp. 467, 488-89 & 489 n.27 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (weighted adjustment based on proportion
of actual apprentices with various levels of education); Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliv-
erers' Union, 384 F. Supp. 585, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (adjustment to exclude labor force with
more than high school education), aff'd, 514 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911
(1976).
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tion should be used.164 Defining the relevant geographical area has
frequently been a source of controversy, since the cities in which many
employers are located typically have a far higher proportion of minority
residents than do the surrounding suburbs.1 65
A number of factors, although possibly relevant to other forms of
numerical orders, have little bearing on a compliance order. Since a
compliance order serves merely to prevent future discrimination, such
an order has no more impact on whites than simple compliance with
the law. Thus it is not necessary that the order be of a short or even
specific duration, or that the proportions it establishes be kept at a low
level. An employer or union is always at liberty to seek to prove that a
change in its attitude and record has eliminated the need for a compli-
ance order; a decree that sets no specific date for ending or reconsider-
ing a compliance order simply leaves the defendant with the
responsibility for seeking reconsideration whenever it believes it can
make the requisite evidentiary showing.
164. The importance of this distinction is starkly illustrated by the error of the Fourth
Circuit in Sledge v.J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981
(1979). The court of appeals concluded that no numerical relief was required since blacks
were 50%o of the defendant's 1972-1975 hires in an area whose workforce was 41%o black. Id.
at 648. The detailed findings of the district court showed, however, that blacks were 67%o of
the applicants in 1972, and that the disparity between the hiring rates among black and white
applicants had gotten worse, not better. In 1969 the company hired 86% of white male appli-
cants and 61%o of black male applicants; in 1972 the hiring rates were 60%o for white males
and 30%o for black males. See Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 16 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1652, 1662-63 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
165. See Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912, 921 (3d Cir. 1978) (problem
noted); Drayton, 477 F. Supp. at 857-58 (suburbs included); Louisville Black Police Officers Org.,
511 F. Supp. at 830-31 (weighted average of city and suburbs); EEOC v. Local 14 Int'l Union
of Operating Eng'rs, 415 F. Supp. at 1170-71 (city figure only used since only 12%o of union
members worked outside city); EEOC v. Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors Local 5, 398 F.
Supp. 1237, 1246-47, 1252-53 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (problem noted), af'd, 538 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir.
1976); Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87, 122 n.4 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (compromise
figure used), rev'd sub nom. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated,
431 U.S. (1977).
In such a case the court should attempt to determine what proportion minorities would
be, in the absence of discrimination, of the actual pool of applicants; the proportion of previ-
ous hires from the suburbs will have been tainted by past hiring discrimination, and the
number of past minority applicants from the city may well have been depressed by past dis-
criminatory practices. Where an employer hires workers from both the city and the suburbs, a
court should use neither city-only nor combined city and suburban figures. Instead the Court
ought to use a weighted combination of both based on the likely proportion of applicants
from each area in the absence of discrimination. These sometimes complex calculations are
not an attempt to delineate a number ofjobs to which minorities are in any sense entitled, but
to ascertain the level of minority hiring or promotions to be expected in the absence of dis-
crimination. That calculation is essentially the same as the type of statistical analyses used to
determine whether an employer or union has engaged in unlawful discrimination. See, e.g.,
Phillips v.Joint Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d 1014, 1026 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 960 (1982). The same percentage figure was used both to ascertain the presence of
discrimination and to establish the appropriate long term goal in a number of cases. See Dray-
ton, 477 F. Supp. at 858, 861; Louisville Black Police Officers Org., 511 F. Supp. at 831, 840.
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B. Procedure Neutralization Quotas
The plurality in Sheet Metal Workers' recognized that numerical or-
ders are at times required to neutralize the effects of "informal mecha-
nisms [that] may obstruct equal employment opportunities." 166 In the
course of finding that an employer or union has engaged in unlawful
discrimination, the courts invariably identify specific practices or proce-
dures that have caused that discrimination. In a variety of rather differ-
ent circumstances, lower courts have concluded that discrimination has
occurred because certain key positions in a company or union were
held by individuals of only one race, and that the prompt and certain
eradication of continuing discrimination required an alteration in the
racial composition of the group of officials or employees who play such
a critical role in the employment process. Race conscious orders in
such cases are used to eliminate the discriminatory impact of a particu-
lar employment practice or procedure by increasing the number of mi-
norities involved in that practice or procedure. In some instances
courts have directed the immediate assignment or appointment of a
specified number of minorities, including a one-time 100 percent or-
der. In other instances, particularly where larger numbers of minority
members are involved, the courts have used lower numerical orders of
longer duration intended to reach, albeit more gradually, the number
of minority members deemed necessary in the critical positions to fi-
nally bring discrimination to an end.
Under the earliest use of such a procedure neutralization order, a
court was to require that a specified number of minorities be placed on
boards or committees that made critical personnel decisions. Courts in
Title VII cases had repeatedly found that discrimination was particu-
larly likely when such decisions were relegated to an all-white group of
officials. 16 7 By including in the decision-making process minority indi-
viduals unlikely to engage in or tolerate continued discrimination, the
courts sharply reduced the danger that new violations would occur. In
some instances the courts merely added minorities to existing boards
or committees; in other cases the courts created new panels on which
minorities were to be included. Courts issued procedure neutralization
decrees directing that specified numbers of minorities be included
among officials responsible for recruiting new applicants,1 68 consider-
ing appeals by rejected applicants, 169 training newly hired workers, 70
166. 106 S. Ct. at 3036.
167. See Paxton v. Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 563-64 n.15 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing
cases), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083 (1983); Rowe v. General Motors Co., 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th
Cir. 1972).
168. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1475, 1483 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (existing recruiting program including six minorities), appeal dismissed, 530 F.2d 501 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 921 (1976).
169. See, e.g., id. at 1482 (new panel, one of three members to be chosen by plaintiff).
170. See, e.g., Williams v. City of New Orleans, 543 F. Supp. 662, 668, 682 (E.D. La.
1982) (four additional black instructors, new "Academy Review Panel" to be half black), rev'd,
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or, more broadly, evaluating all hiring and promotions. 71 Such or-
ders were upheld as "an effective method to prevent future
discrimination." 72
The lower courts have also concluded that numerical orders, partic-
ularly with regard to hiring, are at times necessary to overcome deter-
rent effects of past discrimination. The Sheet Metal Workers' plurality
expressly noted the need to neutralize the deterrent effect of such ear-
lier discrimination.' 73 The fact that an employer or union had for years
excluded all or virtually all minorities, the Supreme Court noted in
1977, could discourage minority applications as surely as "a sign read-
ing 'Whites Only' on the hiring office door."'174 The Court's holding
was amply confirmed by the experience of the lower courts, which re-
peatedly concluded that in particular cases minorities had been de-
terred from applying for jobs or union memberships because the
employer or union's employment record was so bad that it indicated
that such applications would be pointless. 175 Other discriminatory
694 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd on rehearing, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), appeal
dismissed, 763 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Local 3, Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1088, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (minority persons should
be represented on the board of any new program designed for minority training).
171. See, e.g., Ostapowicz v.Johnson Bronze Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1230,
1232 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (one female member to be on new panel "to supervise and evaluate
affirmative action programs, hiring and promotion, and to insure that there is no sex discrimi-
nation in the future operations of the defendant"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,
541 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
172. Ostapowicz, 541 F.2d at 402; see also Williams, 543 F. Supp. at 682 (order will "ensure
the appearance of fairness in police academy decision making"); Local 3, Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1097 (minority representative on board of new pro-
gram will "insure that such a program will be administered in a manner sympathetic to the
particular needs of [minority] trainees.").
173. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986).
174. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365 (1977).
175. Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
895 (1974); United States v. N.L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354, 369 (8th Cir. 1973) ("[A] black em-
ployee with knowledge of the nominal number of black foremen ... could hardly be expected
to make a meaningless request indicating his willingness to be promoted."); Carter v. Gal-
lagher, 452 F.2d 315, 331 (8th Cir. 1971) ("Given the past discriminatory hiring policies of
the Minneapolis Fire Department, which were well known in the minority community ....
minority persons will still be reluctant to apply for employment absent some positive assur-
ance that if qualified they will be in fact hired on a more than token basis."), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 950 (1972); Arnold v. Ray, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 793, 795 (N.D. Ohio 1979);
Association Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F. Supp. 101,
105 (D. Conn. 1979), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 641 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 988 (1982); Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723, 735 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Hogne v.
Bach, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 754, 757 (D. Colo. 1972). Carter was cited with approval
by the plurality in Sheet Metal Workers' 106 S. Ct. at 3036.
The potential impact of an employer's hiring record was graphically illustrated by events
in Chicago in the early 1970s. Following the use in 1971 of a test with a severe discriminatory
effect, minority applications to the city police department dropped sharply; subsequent litiga-
tion resulted in the elimination of that test, and the proportion of minority applications then
rose to well over 1971 levels. Blacks were 33% of the 1971 applicants, 28.6%0 of the 1975
applicants, and 45% of the 1981 applicants. United States v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d 1354,
1361 n.20, 1362 n.23 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc). In 1971, 67% of whites, but only 33% of
blacks, passed the test, and only 10% of those hired were black. United States v. City of
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practices can have a similar enduring discriminatory effect. Blacks are
unlikely to want to work as teachers in "an anti-black, segregated
school system,"176 or to work as police officers in a department with a
well deserved reputation for discrimination against minority officers 177
or violence against minority citizens.' 78
The lower courts have recognized that an employer whose past
practices depressed minority applications remains in violation of the
law until that deterrent effect is eliminated.' 79 In the absence of effec-
tive corrective measures, recruiting by an employer with a reputation
for discrimination will as a practical matter be racially selective recruit-
ing of whites. In a number of instances, employers were directed to
engage in recruitment or publicity specifically designed to attract mi-
nority applicants. But practical experience demonstrated that potential
minority applicants, often with good reason, were unlikely to believe
promises of equal opportunity from an employer whose workforce still
remained virtually all white. After a century of unfulfilled promises of
fairness and equality, blacks and hispanics often perceive little reason
to take seriously another such promise from an employer with a sordid
record of bigotry. As one federal judge observed in 1972, "the best
publicity programs will not fully convince all minority group members
that they now have the opportunity to qualify" for previously all-white
positions.180 In Morrow v. Crisler 1 8 1 and NAACP v. Allen,182 detailed in-
junctions requiring aggressive recruiting of minorities and public assur-
ances of nondiscrimination proved entirely ineffective in inducing
blacks to apply for positions in the then all-white Mississippi and Ala-
bama state police forces, both of which then had well deserved reputa-
tions of bitter hostility towards blacks. In Morrow the Fifth Circuit
concluded in that instance that no "benign recruitment programs can
purge in two years a reputation which discriminatory practices of ap-
proximately 30 years have entrenched in the minds of blacks in Missis-
sippi .... "7183
To end the enduring effects of such discriminatory practices, courts
in a number of instances have concluded that a numerical hiring order
was necessary to promptly place enough minorities in positions from
which they had been barred. This would demonstrate that minorities
could indeed find work with a given employer, thus eliminating the
Chicago, 411 F. Supp. 218, 233-34 (N.D. Ill. 1976),aff'd in part and rev 'd in part, 549 F.2d 415
(7th Cir. 1977).
176. See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 388 F. Supp. 581, 582 (D. Mass. 1975).
177. See Ballard, 390 F. Supp. at 735.
178. See City of Chicago, 411 F. Supp. at 233 & n.16.
179. See, e.g., Morrow, 491 F.2d at 1057.
180. Sims v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 353 F. Supp. 22, 32 (N.D. Ohio 1972),
aff'd in part, 489 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1973).
181. 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974). Morrou, was
cited with approval by the plurality in Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3036.
182. 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
183. Morronw, 491 F.2d at 1056.
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often fatal deterrent effect of past discrimination. The Second Circuit
noted that such orders might be necessary at times "to assure prospec-
tive minority candidates that applying is no longer futile."' 184 The Fifth
Circuit sustained such an injunction as a method "to change the out-
ward and visible signs of yesterday's racial distinctions" and thus over-
come an employer's "reputation as an all-white organization,"'' 85 and
the Eighth Circuit agreed that a decree of this sort was in some in-
stances essential to give minorities "some positive assurance that if
qualified they will in fact be hired on a more than token basis."' 8 6
A procedure neutralization order was issued for rather different rea-
sons in Taylor v. Jones,'8 7 an Eighth Circuit case involving a racial dis-
crimination by a single black civilian employee of the Arkansas National
Guard. The trial court found that the plaintiff had been constructively
discharged from her position, having been forced to resign "by the ra-
cial atmosphere" in her office after having "stayed as long as any self-
respecting black person could have been expected to stay . . . 8
That atmosphere included recurrent racial epithets and slurs, harrass-
ment of and physical threats against blacks, and discrimination in deter-
mining the work duties and salary of the "traditionally 'black job' "held
by the plaintiff.'8 9 The Eighth Circuit concluded, as had other courts,
that the very existence of such a racially discriminatory work atmos-
phere violated Title VII.' 90 The trial and appellate courts in Taylor rec-
ognized that the plaintiff was entitled to more than merely an order
permitting her to resume a position "in a work atmosphere only some-
what improved from the appalling conditions" that had earlier driven
her from the job. 191
The district court concluded as well that only an order requiring the
hiring of additional minority co-workers could be relied on to eliminate
the conditions which prompted the plaintiff's complaint. Although
184. Association Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of Bridgeport, 594 F.2d
306, 311 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979). On remand the district court found that a numerical remedy
was needed to provide such an assurance. 479 F. Supp. 101, 113 (D. Conn. 1979), aff'd in part
and vacated in part, 647 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982). A similar
factual finding was made in Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 354 F. Supp.
778, 797-98 (D. Conn.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), although
the district court read an earlier Second Circuit decision in that case to preclude a numerical
remedy however necessary it might be.
185. Allen, 493 F.2d at 621.
186. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 331 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972).
187. 489 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Ark.), partial reh 'g, 495 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Ark. 1980), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 653 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1981). The Eighth Circuit opinion was quoted
with approval by the plurality in Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3036.
188. 489 F. Supp. at 501.
189. 653 F.2d at 1198-99.
190. Id. at 1199; see also Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238-39 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied
406 U.S. 957 (1972).
191. 495 F. Supp. at 1294.
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blacks were 16 percent of the state population and 23 percent of the
members of the Guard, only 2 percent of the Guard's civilian workers
were black. In light of the testimony of Guard officials, the trial judge
found that:
[A]s the environment approaches a fairer racial representation, the de-
gree of racism tends to diminish ....
[Plaintiff] has standing not only to seek reinstatement, but to seek to
be reinstated in a work place where all people are treated with decency
and respect. The Court finds that this goal will be materially impeded
unless the Arkansas National Guard is required to step up its employ-
ment of qualified black persons .... Racial quotas are philosophically
abhorrent to the Court, but the proof here leaves no choice. There is
simply no other way to ensure that the law will be complied with in the
future. 19 2
The court of appeals sustained this factual finding that a numerical
hiring order was necessary to end discrimination against the named
plaintiff.'9 3 The defendants objected that such orders were not proper
in an individual action, and could be issued only in a class action, but
the Eighth Circuit held that such relief was justified as a measure to
protect the plaintiff from further discrimination.19 4
The circumstances warranting use of a procedure neutralization or-
der are quite distinct from those relevant to a compliance order. As the
deterrence problem in Morrow illustrates, a procedure neutralization
order does not require a showing that a defendant is likely to engage in
continued intentional discrimination. The use of a procedure neutrali-
zation order, rather, requires a court to identify a specific discrimina-
tion practice, including a practice with only a discriminatory effect, that
is likely to recur and that can most effectively be prevented by requiring
that a particular number of minority individuals be placed in specific
positions. The criteria of egregiousness and long-standing discrimina-
tion, although critical to demonstrating the need for a compliance or-
der, are not necessarily relevant to establishing the existence of a
practice requiring a procedure neutralization order. In some instances
of intentional discrimination, such as Taylor v. Jones, a compliance order
192. 495 F. Supp. at 1294, 1296.
193. 653 F.2d at 1204 ("There is no indication that significant improvement will be
made in the work atmosphere to which Taylor must return absent the relief afforded. In fact,
the evidence is to the contrary.").
194. Id. The appellate court stated, "[The remedy's] sole design is to ensure the relief
to which Taylor is entitled-reinstatement into a work place that is not infected with virulent
racism. It is a remedy carefully tailored to fit the circumstances." Id. The trial court had
earlier rejected that same objection:
it is customary for courts, even in individual actions, to award broad injunctive relief
forbidding future discrimination. So here, where the aggravated character of the
evidence justifies affirmative relief, and where that relief is necessary to create a work
place in which black people can maintain their self-respect, it is no bar to the grant-
ing of such relief that plaintiff has never been certified as a class representative.
495 F. Supp. at 1295.
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is of no relevance because the underlying claim of discrimination does
not concern hiring or promotion.
The appropriate structure of a procedure neutralization order is en-
tirely different from that of a compliance order. A court establishing a
procedure neutralization order must make two determinations, neither
of which is necessarily related to the proportion of minorities who
would be hired absent continued discrimination. The first determina-
tion is the number of minorities in the position at issue that, once at-
tained, will neutralize the discriminatory practice at issue. This figure
may be smaller or larger than the number of minorities who would have
occupied that position in the absence of past discrimination. The sec-
ond necessary determination is how fast that level of representation is
to be achieved. A court might order that it occur at once, that only
minorities be given future vacancies until the desired level is reached,
or that a particular portion of all positions be filled with minorities until
that point is achieved. Immediate compliance is the ideal method of
assuring that the practice at issue will cause no further discrimination,
but in some instances that method would require an employer to hire
or promote unneeded employees; where elevation to a better paid posi-
tion is involved, a preference for minorities, whether to be applied at
once or as vacancies occur, will adversely affect whites. A court must
give some consideration to these competing interests in deciding how
to frame a procedure neutralization order, bearing in mind that any-
thing less than immediate and complete neutralization entails a sub-
stantial risk of permitting continued discrimination against minorities.
Under a compliance order, the employer is left with discretion to select
the minority individuals to be included. In the case of procedure neu-
tralization order, this discretion may well be inappropriate if the in-
tended role of those minority employees is to resist and obstruct
further acts of discrimination by their superiors. In such situations the
courts have correctly given the plaintiff a role in making the
selection. 195
Procedure neutralization orders, like compliance orders, are used to
prevent future acts of discrimination against actual victims. But while
those potential victims are the very individuals hired or promoted
under compliance orders, procedure neutralization orders safeguard
potential victims by selecting third parties for particular jobs or assign-
ments. The fact that these third parties-blacks hired as a result of the
Taylor order, for example-may receive benefits from the injunction,
although they may be neither past nor potential future victims of dis-
crimination, is neither objectionable nor remarkable. This result is, as
a practical matter, unavoidable if the courts are to address effectively
the problems discussed above. Both judicial and administrative reme-
dies frequently provide such incidental benefits to third parties.
195. See note 169 supra.
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C. Test Neutralization Orders
A need for numerical remedies unrelated to any problem of inten-
tional discrimination has emerged as a result of the Supreme Court's
1971 decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.' 96 Griggs held that Title VII
forbids the use of employment practices, such as criteria for hiring or
promotion, that have an adverse effect on minorities, unless those prac-
tices are demonstrably job related. Subsequent decisions made clear
that a selection standard has such an adverse impact if it excludes a
disproportionately large number of minority applicants.' 9 7 When an
employer cannot prove that such a standard is a valid predictor of ac-
tual job performance, the employer cannot continue to hire or promote
employees on that basis. The vast majority of lower court decisions
applying Griggs have involved attacks on written examinations used for
hiring or promotion.
In a case where a court has declared an employer's test unlawful, the
fashioning of a new test that will be job related is often a difficult and
time consuming undertaking.'9 8 While such an examination is being
developed, an employer may well need to hire or promote additional
employees. In the case of public agencies, particularly police and fire
departments, continuation of such personnel actions is often vital to
the safety of the community. 199 As a consequence, employers whose
tests have been held unlawful frequently press the courts to fashion or
approve some form of interim hiring or promotion procedure that may
be used until a new test can be devised and approved. 200 Whites who
scored well on the invalid test understandably prefer a remedy that per-
mits continued use of those results even in a modified form.20'
A variety of techniques have been devised by employers and the
196. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
197. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1977) (minimum weight re-
quirement disproportionately excludes women); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975) (company use of Beta examination and Wonderlic Test disproportionately excludes
blacks).
198. See, e.g., NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 706 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (creation of new
test could take four to five years), aff'd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Luevano v. Campbell, 93
F.R.D. 68, 79 (D.D.C. 198 1) (developing new tests will require "a substantial period of time").
199. See Berkman v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 177,216 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("to freeze
all appointments [to the Fire Department] may present a hazardous situation to the citizens of
the community") (quoting Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 360 F. Supp. 1265, 1278
(S.D.N.Y.), af'd in part, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973)), aff'd, 705 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1983); Reed
v. Lucas, I 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 153, 155 (E.D. Mich. 1975) ("Any injunction which
caused continuing vacancies in the... [Sheriff's] Department would jeopardize.., efficient
operation").
200. There is one instance in which an employer and predominantly white union pre-
ferred to adopt a test neutralization order to retain permanently a disputed test. Vulcan Soc'y
v. Fire Dep't of White Plains, 505 F. Supp. 955, 960-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
201. See Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 736-37 (1st Cir. 1972) (district court order
forbidding any use of old test scores unfair to whites who took that test; old list to be utilized
together with test neutralization order); Vulcan Soc'y v. City of New York, 96 F.R.D. 626
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (whites on list based on old test but displaced by test neutralization order to
have priority over applicants who take any subsequent test).
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courts to deal with this common problem. In several cases employers
have added a sufficient number of points to the scores of blacks to elim-
inate the adverse effect of selection on the basis of test scores. 20 2 Test
scores once used to rank applicants have been used instead on a pass-
fail basis, 20 3 or only to sort applicants into several large groups.20 4
Tests have been changed by eliminating specific questions with an ad-
verse impact, 20 5 or used in combination with criteria that have a coun-
tervailing, favorable impact on minorities. Some employers have even
chosen employees by lot.20 6
The most common interim measure, however, is to permit the use
of the disputed test, but to require an employer to hire or promote a
sufficient number of minorities, regardless of test score, to eliminate
the adverse impact of the test.20 7 Thus where blacks comprised 20 per-
cent of the job applicants, but only 5 percent of the applicants receiving
high scores on an invalid test, an employer would be permitted to con-
tinue using the test, provided that the employer actually hired one
black for every four whites. In virtually all of these cases the disputed
test had earlier been used to give eligible applicants comparative rank-
ings; thus the effect of such an order is to require an employer to make
202. See Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 628 F.2d 796, 798 (2d
Cir. 1980) (average black score 268 points below average white score; 250 points added to
score of every black), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1981); cf Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70, 73-
74 (7th Cir. 1979) (all black and hispanic employees given 15.25 "seniority points"). The
EEOC regulations expressly authorize such modifications of test scores. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.14(B)(8)(d) (1986).
203. See Vulcan Soc'y v. Fire Dep't of White Plains, 505 F. Supp. at 959.
204. See Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 711 F.2d 1117, 1123
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
205. See Williams v. City of New Orleans, 543 F. Supp. 662, 682-83 (E.D. La.), rev'd, 694
F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd on rehearing, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), appeal
dismissed, 763 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1985); Vulcan Soc'y v. Fire Dep't of White Plains, 505 F.
Supp. at 959.
206. See Kirkland, 711 F.2d at 1123 (candidates to be "ranked within their zone [based on
test scores] ... by random selection"); Association Against Discrimination in Employment v.
City of Bridgeport, 594 F.2d 306, 313 n.19 (2d Cir. 1979) (adverse effect "could be eliminated
by random selection of appointees from the group of passing candidates, rather than use of
ranking"); Sims v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local 65, 353 F. Supp. 22, 29 (N.D. Ohio,
1972) (apprentices to be selected "from the eligible pool by lottery"), aff'd in part, 489 F.2d
1023 (6th Cir. 1973); see also Luevano v. Campbell, 93 F.R.D. 68, 79 (D.D.C. 1981) (defendant
to use "all practicable efforts" to eliminate adverse impact of test being phased out).
207. See Berkman v. City of New York, 580 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1983),aff'dwithout op.,
755 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985); Guardians Ass'n of the N.Y. Police Dep't, Inc., v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981); Berkman v.
City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 177, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 705 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1983);
Oburn v. Shapp, 393 F. Supp. 561, 574 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975); Penn-
sylvania v. O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084, 1103-04 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd in part and vacated in part,
473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam) (proportional hiring provision affirmed
by equally divided court); Vulcan Soc'y v. City of New York, 96 F.R.D. 626, 628-29 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Reed v. Lucas, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 153, 155-56 (E.D. Mich. 1975); NAACP
v. Seibels, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 670, 686-87 (N.D. Ala. 1977), af'd in part and rev'd
in part, 616 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1980); Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)




different selections from among applicants whom the employer has al-
ready concluded are qualified. 208 The remedial orders either contem-
plate that the necessary number of minority employees will be selected
or promoted on the basis of the disputed test,20 9 or leave the choice of
which minorities to hire or promote to the discretion of the
employer.2 10
The courts have consistently regarded test neutralization orders as
an essential device for ending the unlawful discriminatory impact of
disputed tests. The Sheet Metal Workers' plurality expressly approved the
use of numerical remedies for this purpose: "[P]ending the develop-
ment of nondiscriminatory hiring or promotion procedures ... the use
of numerical goals provides a compromise between two unacceptable
alternatives: an outright ban on hiring or promotions, or continued use
of a discriminatory selection procedure."2 11
This particular form of numerical remedy has occasioned little ob-
jection by defendants or whites, in part, no doubt, because in the ab-
sence of test neutralization orders there could often be no hiring or
promotions at all for a considerable period of time. Such remedies,
one court explained, "only mean that... defendants could not add to
the discrimination already caused by its [sic] illegal practices. The cur-
rent [court-ordered] procedure only prevents additional discrimination,
against minority applicants, during the temporary period while defend-
ants develop constitutional selection procedures. 2 12 The minorities
who benefit from such an order are the individuals who would be actual
victims of the illegal test if that test were used without a numerical mod-
ification. A modification in a ranking that was originally based on an
invalid test does not, by definition, discriminate against better qualified
whites.213 In the absence of a valid test such rankings have no more
208. In those cases in which plaintiffs successfully attacked a test used to reject minori-
ties or women as ineligible, rather than merely to give them low rankings, the courts have
limited participation in test neutralization orders to minorities or women who could actually
pass a new test that assured they were in fact competent to do the work at issue. See Berkman,
536 F. Supp. at 218 ("[q]ualification shall be determined pursuant to procedures agreed upon
by the parties"); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 737 (1st Cir. 1972) (new test).
209. E.g., Oburn, 393 F. Supp. at 569-70; Reed, II Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 156.
210. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Flaherty, 477 F. Supp. 1263, 1267 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Seibels, 14
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 686.
211. 106 S.Ct. at 3037.
212. Oburn, 393 F. Supp. at 575 (emphasis in original); see also Berkman, 705 F.2d at 595
("[s]uch an order does not go beyond the simple elimination of the disparate impact of the
practice found to be discriminatory and is properly regarded as compliance relief"); United
States v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d 1354, 1361 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (order "corrects for
the disparate impact of the ... examination"); Guardians Ass'n of N.Y. Police Dep't, Inc., v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 113 (2d Cir. 1980) (order "designed to make sure that the
City complies with the requirements of Title VII in making appointments to the police
force"), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981).
213. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1974) (a white applicant for public
employment cannot "base any claim.., upon an eligibility ranking which results from unvali-
dated selection procedures.... This is so because by definition ... there is no reliable way to
know that any.., applicant is truly better qualified than others .... "). In upholding the
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significance than numbers drawn by lot, and a test neutralization order
merely eliminates a bias built into the original lottery.
Test neutralization orders are appropriate only in the specific cate-
gory of cases in which an employer seeks to use, on an interim basis, an
invalid test with a racially discriminatory impact. Where such use is
permitted, a test neutralization order, or a modification with a similar
impact, is virtually mandatory, since the denial of relief would result in
additional violations of the law. Ordinarily the level of the order will be
equal to the proportion of minorities among the group actually taking
the test. Where a test has itself deterred minority individuals from
seeking the position involved or from completing the application pro-
cess, a different figure is required, since such a test excludes minorities
in two distinct ways: by deterrence and by outright rejection. 214 Here
a court must attempt to calculate what proportion of minorities would
actually have taken the test had it been a valid examination which they
had a far better chance of passing. Once an invalid test has been re-
placed, further numerical relief may be appropriate, but it would have
to be based on a rationale other than test neutralization.
The principle of test neutralization will at times warrant a second
type of numerical order. The adverse impact of a test is measured not
by its effect on the applicants hired or promoted in a single day, but on
the group of applicants as a whole. Where a court determines that an
unlawful test was used to make past employment decisions, a require-
ment that future hirings or promotions have no adverse impact will not
be sufficient to eliminate the overall adverse impact of the illegal test,
since it will not lead to the hiring or promotion of sufficient minorities
to neutralize the effect of earlier disproportionately white hiring or pro-
motions. An order which fails to take into consideration those earlier
hirings or promotions will have the effect of ensuring that in future
employment decisions a number of whites will be better off, and an
equal number of blacks worse off, than if the test had been neutralized
from the outset.21 5 The only method that will prevent an invalid test
addition of points to the scores of all minority applicants, the Second Circuit emphasized that
the unadjusted scores simply were not a reliable "predictor of on-the-job performance" and
that the program does not "bump white candidates because of their race but rather re-ranks
their predicted performance." Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 628
F.2d 796, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1981).
214. See Berkman, 536 F. Supp. at 177 (applicant rate adjusted due to deterrent effect).
But see Guardians Ass'n, 630 F.2d at 111-13 (trial court to decide whether to use applicant rate
or proportion of minorities in workforce).
215. This problem is illustrated by a hypothetical case in which blacks are 20% of all
applicants. A racially neutral test for hiring 100 applicants would result in the hiring of blacks
numbered 1-20 and whites numbered 1-80. If a test that no black could pass were used to
hire the first 50 workers, a neutralized version of that same test, giving one position in five to
blacks, would mean that the second group of 50 would consist of blacks 1-10 and whites 51-
90. Thus blacks 11-20, who would have been in the second group of50 in the absence of any
discrimination, would still not be hired under a 20% prospective order. A 40% order for the




from continuing to injure still more victims in this way is to require, as
several courts have, that an employer who wishes to continue to use an
invalid test must first give an absolute preference to a sufficient number
of minorities to neutralize the net impact of past hiring or promotions
under that test,21 6 and then hire or promote a sufficient proportion of
minorities to neutralize future applications of the test.
D. Victim Identification Orders
One of the central concerns of Title VII, and of a court in framing a
decree in light of a violation of that statute, is to provide redress that
will, so far as is practicable, correct and compensate for the impact of
any such violation. Most Title VII cases involve discrimination in hiring
or promotions; a remedy for that type of discrimination will ordinarily
involve not only back pay, but also an injunction to assure that those
who were unlawfully denied a job or promotion are given the position
improperly denied them.
By the time a court has established the presence of a violation and is
ready to frame a remedial decree, however, the position originally at
issue will already have been filled, usually by a white employee with no
direct responsibility for the proven act of discrimination. In such cases
most courts have balked at suggestions that they order the demotion or
dismissal of the white beneficiary of that discrimination. 21 7 Rather, the
general practice has been to direct that the next vacancy or vacancies
be offered to the victim or victims of that discrimination, and that any
person discriminated against be awarded "front pay" until he or she
reaches his or her rightful place, the position he or she would have
occupied but for the past discrimination. Such an injunction has the
effect of giving the victims an absolute preference over whites, or other
minorities, who may subsequently seek the position.21 8 Until the pool
216. See, e.g., Kirkland, 711 F.2d at 1123 (promotion preference); Berkman, 705 F.2d at
594-97 (absolute numerical hiring preference). In NAACP v. Seibels, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 670, 686 (N.D. Ala. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 616 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1980),
the court issued a 33% order to remain in effect until sufficient blacks had been hired to
neutralize the effect of past discrimination. The effect of such a limited order, rather than an
absolute preference, was to permit the unlawful test to continue to have an additional discrim-
inatory impact, because the more limited type of order further delayed the date on which
blacks would be hired at the same point in time as would have occurred had no discriminatory
test ever been used. See note 215 supra.
217. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 267-68 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); United Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980,
988 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
218. Ivey v. Western Elec. Co., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1028, 1033-34 (N.D. Ga.
1978) (victims identified under claims procedure to be placed on "Priority Promotion List"
and be given "the first vacancies available in the affected job categories"); Hill v. Western
Elec. Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1157, 1162-63 (E.D. Va. 1976) (victims identified by
special master to be given "priority offers of promotion, transfer, and hiring"), aff'd inpart and
rev'd in part, 596 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1979); Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87, 121
(E.D. Mich. 1973) (victims to receive "first opportunity to apply for vacancies"; procedure for
identifying victims unclear), rev'd sub nom. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir.
1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Vogler v. McCarty, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 491,
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of victims has been exhausted, there is a 100 percent hiring or promo-
tion order in effect. Neither the Reagan administration nor those
judges openly hostile to numerical remedies have questioned the pro-
priety of such preferences for victims of past discrimination.
Although the principle that a victim of discrimination ought to be
restored to his or her rightful place seems simple in theory, the imple-
mentation of that rule often presents complex practical problems.
Most Title VII cases involve not two individuals applying for the same
position, but thousands of individuals seeking hundreds ofjobs or pro-
motions. Employers that engage in racial discrimination do not main-
tain lists of the specific victims of their illegal conduct; such a practice
would be legally suicidal. Employers have every reason not to seek to
identify victims of their own unlawful conduct, or to retain information
that might make such identification possible.
Some types of discrimination, moreover, will by their very nature
make particularly difficult the task of identifying the victims. One of the
most effective discriminatory techniques is to prevent blacks from ever
applying for a position. This tactic assures that it will not be necessary
to actually reject an arguably qualified minority applicant, and increases
the likelihood the minority victims will not complain because they will
not know about the existence of the relevant vacancy or of the act of
discrimination itself. More seriously, from a remedial point of view, it
is especially difficult to construct a list of the individuals who would
have applied had the application process been open to them.
The most common example of this type of discrimination is racially
discriminatory recruiting. Assistant Attorney General Reynolds has
suggested that discrimination in recruiting occurs in virtually all hiring
discrimination cases.21 9 A supervisor who knows the identity of both
white and black workmen may, for example, choose to contact only
whites when a vacancy arises. 220 In the absence of such knowledge, an
employer may simply direct its recruiting at sources likely to have only
white applicants. 22 ' Frequently an employer with an all-white work
force publicizes vacancies by word-of-mouth among its own employees,
who in turn pass along the information to largely white circles of
494, 497 (E.D. La. 1970) (44 named blacks to be admitted to union and "given priority as to
initial referral as employees"), aft'd, 451 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Medical
Soc'y, 298 F. Supp. 145-56 (D.S.C. 1969) (four named blacks to be "given preference... over
all other applicants for the next four vacancies").
219. "[I]n virtually every instance of unlawful employment discrimination, the em-
ployer's search for new employees has been confined-geographically and othenvise-in a
manner that reaches few minority and female applicants." W. Reynolds, Statement Before the
National Foundation for the Study of Equal Employment Policy 7-8 (Nov. 11, 1984).
220. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Go. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 n.9 (1978).
221. E.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 10, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1036, 1041 (D.N.J. 1973); United States v. Bricklayers Local 1, 5 Fair EmpI. Prac. Gas. (BNA)
863, 876 (W.D. Tenn. 1973); United States v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 357,
356 F. Supp. 104 (D. Nev. 1972).
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friends and relatives. 222 Where blacks do approach an employer seek-
ing work, they can be discouraged from making a formal application, 22
3
or be falsely told that no vacancies exist.2 24 An employer's well de-
served reputation for discrimination may be extremely effective in de-
terring minorities; as the Supreme Court noted in Ford Motor Co. v.
EEOC, individuals in need of work "want jobs, not lawsuits."' 225
Even where the identity of the actual or potential applicants is
known, it will still be difficult to construct distinct lists of victims and
nonvictims, separating blacks rejected because of their race from blacks
rejected for legitimate reasons. No employer is likely to maintain
records making any such distinction, and the defense to a Title VII case
will ordinarily include an insistence that all blacks were rejected for
nonracial reasons. A judicial finding that an employer engaged in de-
liberate discrimination frequently will not entail or include any particu-
lar conclusions as to the identity of the victims. If 100 blacks and 100
whites apply for 50 vacancies, and the employer hires 50 whites, a court
might properly find that blacks were rejected on account of race, but it
may well be far from clear precisely which blacks were rejected for that
unlawful reason.
For over a decade the federal courts have struggled with the task of
framing specific remedies in a world fraught with such unavoidable un-
certainties. The lower courts have repeatedly acknowledged the diffi-
culty of reconstructing precisely who would have been placed in what
job in the absence of unlawful discrimination. 226 The remedies that
have evolved are based on a frank recognition of those problems, not
on any pretense that it is possible to ascertain exactly who would have
applied for and received which spot many years in the past. Until now,
it has rarely if ever been suggested that the courts should refuse to
redress violations of the law unless this could be done with surgical
precision. 227 On the contrary, the Supreme Court has frankly acknowl-
222. EEOC v. Local 2P Lithographers, 412 F. Supp. 530, 534 (D. Md. 1976) (due to
word-of-mouth recruiting, relatives of union members placed on apprenticeship waiting list as
young as age 2); EEOC v. International Union of Elevator Constructors Local 5, 398 F. Supp.
1237, 1256 (E.D. Pa.) (due to word-of-mouth recruiting 757o of applicants were friends or
relatives of union members), aff'd sub. nora. United States v. International Union of Elevator
Constructors, 538 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 7
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 710, 748 (W.D. Okla. 1973), aff'd in part, 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir.
1979); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 925-26 (5th Cir. 1973).
223. See, e.g., Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 719-722.
224. See, e.g., id, at 722, 746.
225. 458 U.S. 219, 230 (1982).
226. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1289 n.36, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1115 (1985); McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1982); EEOC v. AT&T, 556
F.2d 167, 180 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); Kirkland v. New York State
Dep't of Correctional Services, 531 F.2d 5, 9 (2d Cir. 1975) (en banc) (Mansfield, J., dissent-
ing); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 315 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 951
(1977); Association Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F. Supp.
101, 114-15 (D. Conn. 1979), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 641 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982).
227. But see Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co., 587 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1978).
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edged that the "process of recreating the past will necessarily involve a
degree of approximation and imprecision." 228
The Supreme Court has dealt with this unavoidable imprecision by
expressly and repeatedly holding that the plaintiff in a Title VII case is
not required to establish with certainty the identity of every actual vic-
tim. 2 29 The burden on a plaintiff is merely to establish the identity of
the group of individuals at which the discriminatory practice was di-
rected. That group may well include some nonvictims, but the plaintiff
does not bear the often impossible burden of further refining this list of
probable victims into certain victims and certain nonvictims. Rather,
the employer is afforded an opportunity to adduce evidence justifying a
further narrowing of that list of likely victims, and the employer bears
the burden of establishing which person or persons among the group
of probable victims were nonvictims. 230 In a case in which blacks actu-
ally apply for positions from which they are excluded, every black appli-
cant is treated as a probable victim, and is entitled to relief unless the
employer can establish that he or she is a nonvictim. 23 1 Where the
method of discrimination involved preventing or deterring blacks from
applying, the plaintiffs' burden is merely to identify blacks who met the
relevant minimum qualifications and who, but for that discrimination
would have applied for the positions involved. The latter requirement
can be met by identifying those blacks whose actual jobs were so abun-
dantly less desirable than the vacancy being filled that they would obvi-
ously have preferred to fill that vacancy "if given a free choice. '23 2
While such a showing may be difficult with regard to blacks already em-
228. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 372 (1977). Judge
Wisdom recently noted that a 50% quota for members of a likely victim pool has a less harsh
impact on whites than the absolute preference that would follow from litigation of the identity
of each victim. Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1584 (5th Cir. 1984) (concur-
ring and dissenting opinion) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 763 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1985).
229. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 371-72; Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,
424 U.S. 747, 772 (1976).
230. In tort cases in which the existence of wrongdoing is clear, but the precise matching
of wrongdoer and victim appears impossible, the wrongdoer has the burden of proof to estab-
lish that she is not responsible for any particular injury. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER
& KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at 271-72 (1984); F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS,
§ 2.03 at 1131 (1956). This problem arises most frequently in tort cases in which it is impossi-
ble to ascertain which of two wrongdoers caused a particular injury, and thus to determine the
identity of an alleged tortfeasor's actual victim. See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199
P.2d 1 (1948) (two defendants negligently fire guns at same time, only one of which hits
plaintiff); Murphy v. Taxicabs of Louisville, 330 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1959) (plaintiff injured by
one of several negligently driven cars); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607
P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (plaintiff unable to identify which manufacturer produced drug
which caused injuries), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). Section 443b(3) of the Restatement
of Torts, Second adopts this rule, explaining that such a shift in the burden of proof is neces-
sary to avoid "the injustice of permitting proven wrongdoers . . . to escape liability merely
because the nature of their conduct and the resulting harm has made it difficult or impossible
to prove which of them has caused the harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 443B com-
ment on subsection 3 (1965).
231. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. at 772.
232. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 369.
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ployed in positions in some ways preferable to that being filled,233 that
showing can be readily made by adducing evidence that a particular
qualified black was unemployed and looking for work.
If this allocation of the burden of proof were mechanically applied
in every case, assuring inclusion of all actual victims by providing relief
to a sometimes larger group of probable victims, that would eliminate
one major reason for numerical remedies. But such a mechanical appli-
cation, while perhaps guaranteeing that no actual victims were omitted,
would at times have extreme results. The pool of likely victims of a
discriminatory practice is in some cases enormous; racially selective
recruiting among out-of-work New York bricklayers, for example,
would exclude thousands of blacks, all of whom could easily establish
that they were well qualified, and that they would have applied for the
positions at issue had the vacancies not been kept secret. As the em-
ployer's burden and the task of separating actual from probable victims
becomes more difficult, the group of probable victims obtaining relief
grows larger, and the percentage of probable victims who were in fact
actual victims becomes smaller. In the example discussed earlier, in
which 100 blacks and 100 whites applied for 50 positions, all of which
were given to whites, it might be possible for an employer to prove that
95 of the 100 rejected black applicants were nonvictims, having been
turned down for nonracial reasons, but it is equally conceivable that the
employer could establish only that 50 or 5 of the blacks were nonvic-
tims. In the latter situations the number of blacks technically entitled
to relief would be 50 or 95, even though there were originally only 50
vacancies. 23 4 It is unlikely that, but for the proven discrimination, all of
the vacancies would have been filled by blacks, and it is of course im-
233. Id. at 369 n.55.
234. The lower courts have correctly insisted that, where the victim identification pro-
cess sanctioned by Teamsters is applied, all victims so identified must receive full relief, regard-
less of the number of such identified victims. In United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, 625
F.2d 918, 935-36 (10th Cir. 1979), the employer had promoted eight apprentices, all white, to
journeymen in the years between 1965 and 1972 that it engaged in racial discrimination. Ap-
plying the Teamsters procedure, the trial court held that Lee Way was obligated to award va-
cancies to six identified victims. Lee Way objected on appeal that since only 8.5% of the area
population was black, only one black would have been hired in the absence of discrimination,
so only one black should have been given a hiring preference. The Tenth Circuit rejected this
argument, insisting that Teamsters required full relief for all identified victims. 625 F.2d at
935-36. In Mims v. Wilson the trial court held that the defendant had unlawfully rejected seven
black applicants because of their race. 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1357, 1358 (N.D. Fla.
1973), vacated, 514 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1975). Since the area population was only 7.2% black,
and the defendant employed fewer than 20 workers, the trial court held that only two class
members were entitled to back pay and hiring preference. 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at
1358, 1359. The Fifth Circuit reversed, explaining:
The district court may have been influenced in limiting relief to two members of the
class by the consideration that the racial composition of employees in the sheriff's
office would then mirror the racial composition in the community. This bears no
legal relevance to the relief the discriminatees are entitled to assuming each had
qualifications superior to those of the white hired in his stead. It stops short of re-
turning the black discriminatee to his 'rightful place' .....
514 F.2d 106, 109 n.5 (5th Cir. 1975).
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possible that 95 black applicants would have been hired. Second, an
actual victim of hiring discrimination would ordinarily be entitled, at
the least, to the next available vacancy, enjoying priority over all more
recent pending applicants. But as the degree of uncertainty and thus
the size of the probable victim group grows, the delay faced by new
applicants would increase.
These interrelated problems can be dealt with in a sensible prag-
matic manner by means of a numerical order. Several lower courts
have used that approach, although none of the reported opinions con-
tains a direct explanation of why those courts are doing so. In those
cases in which the potential size of the probable victim group exceeds
the number of likely actual victims, or even the number of relevant va-
cancies, the courts have at times simply ordered the hiring or promo-
tion of a specified number of members of that group.235 Typically that
number is the difference between the number of blacks actually hired
or promoted and the number which, under all the circumstances, it
seems likely that the employer would have hired or promoted in the
absence of discrimination. Thus where 100 blacks and 100 whites ap-
plied for 50 vacancies, all of which went to whites, the number of blacks
permitted to obtain relief might be limited to 25. An injunction of this
sort places a ceiling on the number of individuals who receive hiring or
promotion preference, and dispenses with the individualized identifica-
tion process.
Such a ceiling, of course, unavoidably entails a risk that a number of
actual victims will be denied make-whole relief, either because the ceil-
ing is too low, or because the wrong probable victims will be afforded
that relief. The lower courts, however, seem to have concluded that
such a ceiling strikes a reasonable balance between the goal of restor-
ing victims to their rightful places and the interests of subsequent white
applicants who will necessarily be adversely affected by any rightful
235. For decisions issuing numerical hiring or promotion orders of this sort, see note
234 supra. The clearest account of this type of order is in Association Against Discrimination
in Employment v. City of Bridgeport. The district court, ordering the hiring of 102 minori-
ties, explained:
The hiring of an additional 102 minority persons would create a situation in which
the percentage of minority firefighters hired since January 1, 1971 roughly would
equal the percentage of minority persons in the population of the City. In theory,
these 102 positions should go to those minority individuals who would have been
hired had there been no discrimination. Recognizing that, at this point in time, it is
impossible to identify these individuals with any certainty, the Court must exercise its
discretion to fashion an equitable means of selecting the individuals to be hired.
479 F. Supp. 101, 115 (D. Conn. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 641 F.2d 256 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982). The court ordered that the list be composed of re-
jected applicants who could pass certain medical and physical tests. If there were fewer than
102 such rejected applicants, a procedure was to be used for identifying and adding to the list
individuals who were deterred from applying because of the defendants' reputation for dis-
crimination. Id. The Second Circuit upheld the order as a reasonable method of providing
compensatory relief, noting that the inherent risk that the order might be over or underindu-
sive was simply unavoidable. 647 F.2d at 281-87.
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place relief for apparent victims. What looks at first blush like a quota
hiring or promotion order is in fact a quota ceiling designed to protect
whites from the potentially extreme effect of a mechanical application
of the normal evidentiary rules for identifying the victims of past
discrimination.
Where such a ceiling is imposed, the courts often accord an em-
ployer considerable discretion in filling the positions at issue from the
pool of likely victims. This is ordinarily a sensible approach, since an
employer is likely for economic reasons to select the best qualified indi-
viduals from that group, and the best qualified individuals are particu-
larly likely to be the blacks whose earlier rejections were due, not to any
lack of qualification, but to race. White workers or applicants have no
particular interest in the unavoidable imprecision involved in selecting
the appropriate minorities out of the likely victim pool.
The lower courts that have chosen to authorize such ceilings have
refused to go further and permit an employer or others to seek to prove
that the number of actual victims is lower than the ceiling. This prac-
tice, although used without judicial explanation, is clearly appropriate if
an employer chooses to contest on a case-by-case basis the identity of
every victim. The employer must run the risk that that litigation tactic
will fail-specifically the risk that, unable to establish the presence of a
greater number of nonvictims, it will have to provide make-whole relief
to a group substantially larger in number than the ceiling a court might
have set. Assuming arguendo that these ceiling orders do not violate
the rights of blacks, a court clearly should not both accord an employer
the benefits of such ceiling and also permit the employer to pursue vic-
tim-by-victim litigation. Frequently the primary beneficiaries of such a
ceiling will be, not the employer, but innocent white employees or ap-
plicants, and an employer who insists on waiving the ceiling and pursu-
ing individualized litigation may be gambling away the jobs of those
whites. A federal court charged with responsibility for considering the
interests of such whites 236 clearly need not permit an employer to un-
dertake such a course of action.
The number of minorities to be hired under such a victim identifica-
tion order is the number of minorities who would have been hired but
for the proven discrimination, less the number in fact hired. That fig-
ure will have to reflect both the actual impact of the employer's discrim-
ination and any related deterrence of minority applications, as well as
the likely interest and qualifications of potential minority candidates. 237
A victim identification order is not to be used for the selection of mi-
norities from the public at large, but should be limited to a pool or list
of likely victims that has been constructed in such a way as to maximize,
to the degree feasible, the probability that any participant was in fact a
236. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 372.
237. See text accompanying notes 173-177 supra.
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victim.23 8 While the calculation of the total number of workers to be so
hired or promoted raises an essentially factual question, the rate at
which those hirings or promotions should occur necessarily involves a
degree of discretion. Where victims have been identified with certainty,
a 100 percent hiring or promotion order is ordinarily used to get them
to their rightful places as quickly as possible. But where a victim identi-
fication order is used, some of the courts have been reluctant to resort
to so harsh a decree, and have been inclined to use a lower figure,239 so
long as the hiring or promotion of the victims identified in this un-
avoidably less certain method is still completed with reasonable
dispatch.
Nothing in this use of numerical remedies is inconsistent with the
Reagan administration's insistence that compensatory relief be limited
to "known" or "identifiable" victims. 2 40 Rather, this approach is simply
a sensible method of identifying those victims. It is not, in the adminis-
tration's terms, "victim blind,"' 24 1 for the pool of blacks from whom
participants are drawn is limited to likely victims of discrimination, and
the order identifies the victims with as much precision as an imperfect
world allows. To require more would be largely to nullify Title VII. A
requirement of absolute certainty would simply channel discrimination
into those techniques, such as racial recruiting, which make any such
precision impossible, and would give employers an irresistible incentive
to avoid making or keeping the sorts of records that would facilitate the
identification of victims. If this is what the Administration has in mind,
then the legal standard that it characterizes as a call for relief for all
victims would in reality be a prohibition against relief for almost any
victim, an insistence on a degree of certainty which a discriminatory
employer would always be at liberty to make impossible.
238. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Flaherty, 477 F. Supp. 1263, 1265-66 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (mi-
norities ranked low due to non-job-related test); United States v. San Diego County, 21 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 402, 411 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (minorities now in position from which
defendant promoted only whites); Association Against Discrimination in Employment, 479 F. Supp.
at 115 (rejected applicants and persons deterred from applying).
239. Both absolute preferences and lower partial preferences are common. Only a hand-
ful of decisions explain the basis upon which that choice was made. See United States v. N.L.
Indus., 479 F.2d 354, 377 (8th Cir. 1973) (507 until 15 blacks hold front-line foreman posi-
tions); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 331 (8th Cir. 1971) (33%7 until 20 members of
minority groups are hired), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Association Against Discrimination in
Employment, 479 F. Supp. at 114 n.16 (100%o); EEOC v. AT&T, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
390, 420-21 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (100%).
240. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STATEMENT CONCERNING THE DETROIT PO-
LICE DEPARTMENT'S RACIAL PROMOTION QUOTA, 2-3 (Jan. 17, 1984).
241. To complain that remedies for probable victims are "victim blind" is to mis-
characterize both the nature and reason for such relief. The metaphor suggests that the iden-
tities of actual victims and nonvictims can readily be perceived, if only the courts are willing to
look. In reality that is an identification which is frequently impossible to make with absolute
certainty, and the difficulty in doing so stems, not from any indifference on the part of federal
judges, but from the action of the employer itself in engaging in a form of discrimination
calculated to prevent a court from making that very distinction.
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E. Indirect Victim Orders
For two decades the Supreme Court has insisted, in a variety of con-
texts, that federal courts have a duty "to render a decree which will so
far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past. '242 The
purposes of that command are preventative as well as compensatory.
An earlier act of discrimination may set into motion events which will
cause injuries long into the future; the eradication of the effects of past
discrimination requires not only redress for past injuries, but affirma-
tive measures to break any ongoing chain of injuries. A decree which
lacks such breadth may well permit the original act of discrimination to
cause still further harm, rendering permanent, albeit partially success-
ful, the original unlawful discrimination, and giving hope to potential
wrongdoers that similar conduct will also succeed even where detected
by the courts.
A substantial number of federal employment discrimination cases
present precisely this problem. In a wide variety of contexts discrimi-
natory employment practices injure not only the individuals who are
the immediate objects of those practices, but also harm, over an ex-
tended period of time, indirect victims as well. The lower courts have
correctly sought to provide redress for those indirect victims, and in
some instances the remedies involved have been numerical.
If judicial redress were available immediately after every act of dis-
crimination, the fashioning of remedies, problems of identifiability
aside, would be relatively easy. Were a discriminatory denial of ajob on
a Monday the subject of a trial on Tuesday, and a final order on
Wednesday, such nearly instantaneous judicial relief would be virtually
the equivalent of preventing the violation in the first place. The appli-
cant who unsuccessfully sought work on Monday will ordinarily stand
ready to accept that same position if it is offered a few days later. When
the period between violation and relief is merely a matter of hours or
days, that violation will ordinarily cause only a small and readily calcu-
lable injury to the rejected applicant, and is not likely to affect anyone
else. Because the position of the actual victim will rarely if ever change
during such a brief period, that victim will, of course, welcome a judi-
cially compelled job offer equivalent to the offer he or she sought only
days earlier.
But such instantaneous justice simply is not available in the federal
courts for the victims of racial discrimination. In Title VII actions, as in
all other types of civil rights cases, lengthy delays in litigation are now
commonplace. 243 Title VII itself requires administrative proceedings
242. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (quoting Louisiana v.
United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)).
243. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228 (1982).
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which can consume close to a year,244 and the processing of such com-
plaints by the EEOC often takes considerably longer.245 The pre-trial
proceedings are ordinarily lengthy even in an individual case, and dis-
covery in a complex class action can itself require years. Appeals of in-
terlocutory orders, or of orders dismissing claims prior to trial, are also
common. 246 Even after a final decision at the trial court level, another
year or two can be consumed in appeals, which may in turn be followed
by further proceedings on remand. Total delays of as much as a decade
are not unheard of. 24 7
It is during this often lengthy delay that the discriminatory effects
which a court must correct will occur. The impact of a discriminatory
act, like the effect of any other action, will inexorably become greater
and more complex with the passage of time, affecting an increasing
number of individuals in any number of possible ways. The passage of
time will alter the position of those immediately affected by the act of
discrimination as well-the black denied the job or other benefit, the
white beneficiary of that action, and the employer or other perpetrator.
Because of the combined effects of these changes, a court called upon
to fashion a remedy several years after an unlawful act confronts conse-
quences of that discrimination often radically different from those
which existed immediately after that act initially occurred.
In an ideal world in which the federal courts could dispense instant
justice, the effects of past discrimination could be eliminated by di-
recting an employer to hire the particular individuals whom it earlier
had rejected on the basis of race. Where discrimination in promotions
is concerned, such an order may indeed be effective even years later,
since the original victims will frequently be in the same positions, still
seeking the same vacancies. But in a hiring discrimination case that will
only rarely if ever be the situation. 248 Jobless black applicants rejected
because of their race by one employer simply cannot afford to remain
244. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (prior to suit, charge must have been pending for 180 days
before EEOC, and 60 to 120 days before relevant state agency).
245. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454,455-56 (1975) (four year
delay between filing of charge and issuance of right to sue letter); 5 U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, at 529-33 (1974) (median
delay of 32 months); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCE-
MENT EFFORT-A RASSESSMENT 88 (1973) (backlog of 53,410 charges).
246. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
247. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 279 (1982) (11 years); Ford
Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 222 (10 years); Albenzarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 408 (9 years).
248. The value of admission to an educational institution, like a job offer, is inherently
transitory. A black rejected for racial reasons by one school will ordinarily pursue his or her
education elsewhere. The education which he or she actually receives may not be as good as
that which would have been obtained at the discriminatory institution. But the passage of
time after the discriminatory rejection of an application will necessarily render a subsequent
offer less valuable and ultimately useless. Admission to a white college as a freshman in 1984
is very different than admission as a sophomore in 1985, or as a junior in 1986. With each
passing year a transfer involves more educational and personal disruption. By 1988, when the
rejected applicant is attending graduate or professional school or working for a living, a court
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unemployed for years, hoping that a court will someday direct recon-
sideration of their applications. Indeed, a rejected applicant cannot
choose to remain jobless during the pendency of a Title VII case, even
if financially able to do so, without fatally compromising his or her
claim, since he or she has a legal duty to seek other work and mitigate
the damages suffered. 249 Thus the direct victim of discrimination in
hiring, an individual who by definition was sufficiently qualified that his
or her rejection had to be based on race, will almost invariably find
other employment during the pendency of a Title VII action.
The more blatant the original discriminatory act, and the more sub-
stantial the qualifications of the rejected black, the greater the odds that
the victim will readily and quickly250 find other employment. By the
time a federal court finally fashions a remedial decree, that original di-
rect victim will have acquired extensive seniority and experience in an-
otherjob with a different employer; few sensible employees are likely to
choose to abandon such a comparatively secure position for a job with
an employer which is known to be hostile251 and which is only offering
employment because forced to do so by a court order. The number of
civil rights plaintiffs who have been dismissed after receiving court or-
dered jobs or promotions makes apparent the risks involved in ac-
cepting such relief.25 2 Even a rejected employee who might otherwise
be willing to run these risks is not going to do so if he or she has moved
to another city or state in search of work.
The circumstances of the Title VII cases in the Supreme Court illus-
trate how readily such delays remove the immediate victims of discrimi-
nation from the ranks of interested applicants. In Franks v. Bowman
Transportation Co.,253 a total of 166 qualified blacks had unsuccessfully
sought truck driver jobs during the relevant limitations period.254 In
July 1972, a federal judge finally ordered the defendant to give these
identifiable direct victims priority in consideration for such jobs, but
order directing his or her admission to a white college as an undergraduate would simply be a
joke.
249. See Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 232-33.
250. Although the prospect of a back pay award will at times operate to deter discrimina-
tion, in hiring discrimination cases the subsequent employment which ends a direct victim's
interest in a job offer will also cut off or sharply reduce back pay liability. The more blatant
the discrimination, and the greater the skills of the rejected black, the quicker that victim will
find other employment. Thus the worst cases of discrimination in hiring will ordinarily give
rise to the smallest back pay awards and the smallest monetary incentive to obey the law.
251. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 246 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Whenever I
had worked at Ford before, I had been badgered... I had a fear to go back. I didn't know
what I would be facing .. "); id., at 247 ("Neither woman... wanted to be the only woman
employed in the Ford warehouse.") (quoting trial court).
252. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 752 n.4 (1976) (named
plaintiff, hired after filing charge with EEOC, fired six months later); see also Memorandum
Suggesting Mootness at 2, Franks (No. 74-728).
253. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
254. Id. at 776 n.36.
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only five or six of those individuals actually took the position. 25 5 In
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC,25 6 two rejected female job applicants were the
plaintiffs in a successful Title VII action, but the court of appeals did
not finally sustain the finding of discrimination until 1981,257 more
than seven years after both individuals had taken a similar position with
General Motors. 258 The history of Title VII cases in the lower courts
reflects a similar pattern.259
The impact of this unavoidable delay in obtaining any judicial relief
might be of little concern if discrimination in employment never in-
jured anyone except the individual personally rejected for ajob or pro-
motion. But practical experience teaches that an unlawful action may
injure not only the original direct victim, but other subsequent and in-
direct victims. Where a tortfeasor acts in a negligent manner, his or her
liability extends, not only to the immediate victim, but to any other in-
dividuals whose injuries were reasonably foreseeable. Thus, if A negli-
gently ignites a fire in B's home, the fire spreads to C's home, and
firefighters are compelled to hose down D's home to save it, thus caus-
ing water damage to D's property, A is liable to B, C, and D. 260 The
identity of the indirect victim need not be foreseeable so long as an
injury to a person in that position was reasonably foreseeable at the
time of the original misconduct.
The Supreme Court has recognized on several occasions the diverse
ways in which acts of racial discrimination can harm such indirect vic-
tims. In Rogers v. Paul the Court held that black students had standing
to challenge racial discrimination in the assignment of faculty, noting
that such assignments inherently denied black students equality of edu-
cational opportunity.26 1 Manifestly, a policy of racial discrimination in
the hiring of faculty would affect black students in a similar way. In
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. the Court noted that the dis-
criminatory exclusion of blacks from a residential apartment building
could injure white residents by denying them the social benefits of liv-
255. Id.
256. 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
257. 645 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981).
258. 458 U.S. at 222.
259. See AT&T v. EEOC, 556 F.2d 167, 180 (3d Cir. 1977) (numerical remedies at times
required "to counteract the effects of discriminatory practices because some victims no longer
seek the job benefits which they were discriminatorily denied"), cert. deniedsub nom. Communi-
cations Workers v. EEOC, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); White v. Carolina Paperboard Corp., 564
F.2d 1073, 1090 (4th Cir. 1977) (most of class members no longer interested in disputed
position); Bledsoe v. Wilker Brothers, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 127, 131 (W.D. Ky.
1980) (successful plaintiff, now working as a supervisor for another firm, too disgusted with
defendant to return to work there).
260. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, 43 (1984).
261. 382 U.S. 198, 200 (1965); see also Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 382 U.S. 103
(1965) (injury to students caused by faculty segregation not entirely speculative); cf.
Bridgeport Guardians v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 354 F. Supp. 788, 797 (D.Conn.) (public has "a
right to the enforcement of law by a police department staffed on a non-discriminatory ba-
sis"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973).
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ing in an integrated community and by cutting residents off from the
business and professional advantages which might arise if they lived
with members of minority groups.262 Gladstone Realtors v. Bellwood held
that certain portions of the 1968 Civil Rights Act extended to "all vic-
tims-both direct and indirect-of housing discrimination. ' 263 The
Court noted that a practice by realtors of steering only black buyers to
an integrated but changing neighborhood could injure existing resi-
dents, as well as the city itself, by driving down the value of homes,
reducing the tax base, or provoking a flight of white residents that
would result in a segregated city and school system. 264
Neither the indirect injuries with which these cases were concerned,
nor any redress that might have been attained, depended on the partic-
ular identity of the specific black teachers, apartment hunters, or home
buyers initially harmed by the original act of discrimination. In Rogers
the students sought not the assignment to their school of the specific
black and white teachers whose "rightful place" that school might be,
but simply an integrated faculty. If the original black faculty victims in
Rogers, for example, had been fired, or had left for an integrated school
system, the students' injuries would not have been remedied simply by
offering assignments to black former teachers who no longer wanted
them. The constitutional interests of the student indirect victims re-
quired, if the direct faculty victims were understandably no longer in-
terested in working for the defendant school system, that other black
teachers, in numbers comparable to the number of original direct vic-
tims, be hired.265 Similarly, in Trafficante the black apartment hunters
rejected earlier because of their race were in all likelihood living else-
where and not interested in moving; a pointless offer of apartments to
those direct victims clearly could not have ended the white tenants' in-
juries. Only by renting to a number of black tenants comparable in
number to, although not necessarily the same individuals as, the origi-
nal direct victims could the landlord bring an end to the injuries of
which Mr. Trafficante and the other plaintiffs complained.
Whether a Title VII case involves indirect victims whose interests
must be separately considered will depend on the particular circum-
stances of each case. Of course, if all of the original direct victims will
accept the jobs or promotions that were earlier denied unlawfully, fur-
ther injury to indirect victims will ordinarily end. Even where some or
all direct victims no longer want rightful place relief, the nature of the
proven discriminatory practice may not entail injury, or at least ongo-
ing injury, to any third parties. But where the exclusion of blacks from
262. 409 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1972).
263. 441 U.S. 91, 100-02 (1979).
264. Id. at 110, 111, 115.
265. In school desegregation cases in which school authorities had illegally dismissed
minority teachers, the courts commonly required the hiring of a sufficient number of black
teachers to restore the level that existed prior to those illegal terminations. See note 266 infra.
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ajob or workforce causes such ongoing injuries, steps must be taken to
integrate that job or workforce, and thus end those continuing injuries
to indirect victims, even if the original direct victims are no longer in-
terested in the positions at issue.
Federal courts have identified a number of distinct circumstances in
which employment discrimination causes indirect injuries. The most
frequent example is racial discrimination in the selection of public em-
ployees, particularly teachers, 266 firefighters, 267 and police officers. 268
When Title VII was amended in 1972 to prohibit discrimination in pub-
lic employment, the Senate Report explained:
This failure of State and local governmental agencies to accord equal
employment opportunities is particularly distressing in light of the im-
portance that these agencies play in the daily lives of the average citi-
zen. From local law enforcement to social services, each citizen in a
community is in constant contact with many local agencies .... Dis-
crimination by government therefore serves a doubly destructive pur-
pose. The exclusion of minorities from effective participation in the
bureaucracy not only promotes ignorance of minority problems in that
particular community, but also creates mistrust, alienation, and all too
often hostility toward the entire process of government.
26 9
The Civil Rights Commission studies that contributed to Congress'
decision to apply Title VII to state and local agencies concluded that
racial discrimination in the selection of police, teachers or other gov-
ernment officials was a major cause of racial discrimination by the agen-
266. Kromnick v. School Dist., 739 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1107
(1985); Morgan v. O'Bryant, 671 F.2d 23, 27 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 881 (1982); Ar-
thur v. Nyquist, 520 F. Supp. 961, 966 (W.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd in part and reu'd in part, 712 F.2d
816, 817 (2d Cir. 1983); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 431,432 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
935 (1976); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 599, 600 n.3 (1st Cir. 1975).
267. NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965, 977-78 (1st Cir. 1982); Association Against Dis-
crimination v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F. Supp. 101 (D.Conn. 1979), aff'd in part and vacated in
part, 647 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982); Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 13
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1468, 1473 (E.D. Pa. 1974), appeal dismissed, 530 F.2d 501 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 921 (1976).
268. Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1575 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(Wisdom, J., concurring and dissenting); Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 923-24 (6th Cir.
1983); Beecher, 679 F.2d at 977-78; United States v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d 1354, 1364 (7th
Cir. 1981); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (5th Cir. 1974); Erie Human Relations
Comm'n v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371, 375 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. City of Buffalo, 22 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 577, 580 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); Officers forJustice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1304, 1309 (N.D. Cal. 1977); United States v. City of Chicago,
411 F. Supp. 218, 240 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir.
1977); Pennsylvania v. Flaherty, 404 F. Supp. 1022, 1030 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Officers forJustice
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 371 F. Supp. 1328, 1341-42 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Bridgeport Guardians,
Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 354 F. Supp. 788, 797 (D. Conn.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 482
F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973).
269. S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1971). See also H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. 17 (1971): "The problem of employment discrimination is particularly acute
and has the most deleterious effect in these governmental activities which are most visible to
the minority communities (notably education, law enforcement, and the administration ofjus-




cies involved. 270 The Koerner Commission had also urged that the
eradication of discrimination by government employees required the
elimination of discrimination in the hiring and promotion of those very
employees. 271 The 1972 amendments to Title VII were adopted at a
time when the problems arising out of discrimination in public employ-
ment had reached a crisis level in many cities. All-white police units in
black communities were often regarded by those communities and by
the police themselves as an occupying military force, with police-com-
munity relations hostile at best and frequently violent.
Courts adopted remedies for such public employment discrimina-
tion in light of the severe and continuing harms that followed from the
creation of virtually all white public agencies. An agency tainted by dis-
crimination in staffing, particularly a police department, was likely to
experience severe difficulty in winning the public confidence and assist-
ance necessary for the work of that agency. 272 White employees in a
virtually all-white agency were more likely to engage in conduct that
was discriminatory, or thoughtlessly offensive or harmful to blacks,
either because they followed the example of discrimination set by the
agency's employment policies, or because those employees were not
exposed to the leavening effects of working with black colleagues.
Members of the public who suffer the indirect effects of such public
employment discrimination may be injured even more seriously than
the original direct victims of that discrimination. Blacks denied jobs in
an all-white police force will ordinarily lose only income, but blacks
who must deal with such a force on the streets may well lose their lives.
And while the harm to a direct victim may sooner or later end if he or
she finds another job, the recurring injuries inflicted on the black com-
munity by the resulting all-white agency may well continue indefinitely.
The grave though indirect injuries suffered by the community, par-
ticularly the black community, as a result of public employment dis-
270. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE ADMINISTRATION
OFJUSTiCE IN THE SOUTHVEST (1970); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FOR ALL THE PEOPLE...
By ALL THE PEOPLE, 71-82 (1969).
271. U.S. NAT'L ADVISORY CoMm. ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 165-67 (1968); see also
Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 695 (6th Cir. 1979) (citing authorities),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981).
272. Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d at 1575 & n.14 (Wisdom, J., concurring
and dissenting); Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d at 923-24 (6th Cir. 1983); Beecher, 679 F.2d
965 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d at 1364; Talbert v. City of
Richmond, 648 F.2d 925, 929 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982); Young, 608
F.2d at 695; NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d at 621; Tullio, 493 F.2d at 375; Bridgeport Guardians, 482
F.2d at 1341; OfficersforJustice, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1309; United States v. City of
Chicago, 411 F. Supp. 218, Flaherty, 404 F. Supp. at 1029-30; Pennsylvania v. Glickman, 370
F. Supp. 724, 734-36 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Bridgeport Guardians, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 59,
60-61 (D. Conn. 1983); OfficersforJustice, 371 F. Supp. at 1341-42; Castro v. Beecher, 365 F.
Supp. 655, 659, (D. Mass. 1973); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa
Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 896-97 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (minority citizens have standing to litigate
police and fire department hiring discrimination because of adverse effects of such discrimina-
tion on police and fire services).
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crimination will continue so long as the government agency staffed in
that discriminatory manner remains disproportionately white. The ra-
cial composition of that workforce, and the consequent harms, are the
direct effect, often the intended effect, of past discrimination-an effect
that must be ended to correct the original violation. Because discrimi-
nation in public employment causes such broad and ongoing injuries,
the original violation would not be fully redressed, for example, by an
order providing rejected minority job applicants with back pay and pro-
spective front pay, but no jobs, or by offering jobs to rejected minority
applicants who no longer wanted the positions. The only way to end
the ongoing injuries set into motion by the past discrimination is to
place minority employees in the discrimination-tainted agencies. Re-
gardless of whether those minority employees were themselves actual
direct victims, their appointment is necessary to end continuing harms
to actual indirect victims.
In the case of private as well as public employers, racial discrimina-
tion in hiring and firing under certain circumstances will also injure
those minority employees who are not themselves direct victims of that
practice. A present employee has a vital personal stake in preventing
future discrimination in promotions, discipline and assignments, and in
redressing any past forms of discrimination of which he or she may
have been a victim. As a practical matter, any one employee's ability to
protect and advance that interest is directly affected by the presence or
absence in the workforce of employees with similar interests and con-
cerns. When an employee undertakes to press an employer or union to
correct or prevent discrimination, it will often be vital that that under-
taking be made in concert with a substantial number of other workers.
An employer is likely to respond very differently to a complaint from 20
percent of its workforce than one from 2 percent of that workforce.
Within a labor union, the likelihood that the union will deal aggres-
sively with a problem of discrimination is clearly greater if more mem-
bers want that action taken. Although it is technically possible for a
single employee to bring suit to end discriminatory practices, in a large
number of cases organizations of minority employees, rather than indi-
viduals, have brought this type of litigation.273 Such a group effort,
273. Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 588 F.2d 235 (8th Cir.
1978); Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 390 (2d Cir. 1973); Louisville Black
Police Officers Org. v. City of Louisville, 511 F. Supp. 825 (W.D. Ky. 1979), aft'd, 700 F.2d
268 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. City of Chicago, 411 F. Supp. at 225, 241 (Afro American
Patrolman's League); Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 66 F.R.D. 598 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (Club Valiants),
aft'd, 530 F.2d 501 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 921 (1976); Reed v. Lucas, 11 Fair EmpI.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 153 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (Guardians of Michigan, Inc.); Firebird Soc'y v. New
Haven Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 66 F.R.D. 457 (D. Conn.), aftd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 867 (1975); Afro Am. Patrolmen's League v. Duck, 366 F. Supp 1095, (N.D.
Ohio 1973), aff'd in part, 503 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1974); Officers forJustice, 371 F. Supp 1328;
Bridgeport Guardians, 354 F. Supp. at 783; Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, 370 F. Supp. 251
(N.D. Ohio 1972); Hull v. Cason, 14 Cal. App. 3d 344, 171 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1978) (Oakland
Black Fire Fighters Association).
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which requires the presence of a significant number of minority em-
ployees, is likely to provide the litigation with financial and other sup-
port that no single plaintiff could. 2 7 4
When an employer systematically rejects minority applicants or
purges minority employees from its workforce, it severely impairs the
ability of the remaining minority employees to make common cause
with like minded and similarly situated fellow workers. Within a union,
where elections and decisions are made on a one-member-one-vote ba-
sis, such discrimination harms blacks in precisely the same way that dis-
enfranchising half the blacks in a city would injure those who were still
able to vote. The lack of such allies is of similar importance for blacks
who want to engage in concerted activity to change an employer's prac-
tices by persuasion or litigation. A rule that forbade half the black work-
ers in a plant from engaging in such joint activities, or voting in a
union, would clearly injure those blacks not subject to that prohibition.
A discriminatory employment decision to fire half of those workers, or
not to hire a similar number, causes precisely the same injury.
Here, as with public employees, correcting the continuing effects of
illegal past hiring or dismissal practices requires that blacks be added to
the workforce, regardless of whether the original victims can be found
or any longer want the jobs. Two circumstances must be present to
justify a remedy aimed at indirect injury of this sort. First, the number
of blacks fired, or not hired, for discriminatory reasons must be large
enough to adversely effect the ability of black employees to engage in
effective concerted activity on issues of particular concern to blacks.
Clearly the dismissal or rejection of a single black would not have such
an impact. Second, employment and other conditions at the workplace
must be such that minority workers regard themselves as having the
kind of special common interests that make the ability to engage in con-
certed activity important.275 Although assessing those concerns may at
times pose subtle problems, it will almost invariably be the case that
such concerted activity is a matter of concern among minority employ-
ees at a plant or office where the union or employer has engaged rela-
tively recently in racial discrimination. A judge's confidence that all
racial abuses have ended is irrelevant if black workers themselves still
perceive a danger that those or similar problems will recur.
In fashioning a remedy for discrimination injuring third parties, the
critical issue is time.2 76 Once an employer ceases discriminating, the
274. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. I (1964); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
275. Cf Thornburg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986) (importance of no dilution of
minority group strength in voting context).
276. Most numerical orders merely recite that the defendant must hire or promote at a
given rate until a particular workforce level is reached. A number of opinions, however, rec-
ognize that the critical consideration in framing a hiring or promotion order is the amount of
time that will be necessary to reach the desired level. See, e.g., United States v. New York, 475
F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (40% order will reach desired level in 5 years); Associa-
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effect of past discrimination on the composition of its workforce will
slowly dissipate, and by the date when the direct victims would have
retired, perhaps thirty or forty years after the original violation, there
may well no longer be any new injuries to third parties. The question
before a court attempting to end such indirect injuries is how much
affirmative action to use to reduce the length of the period of that con-
tinuing third party injury. In some cases those injuries could be ended
in a reasonably short period of time without resort to numerical reme-
dies; in other instances only a numerical order will suffice to avoid in-
tolerable delay. The preferable procedure would be for a court,
bearing in mind an employer's normal hiring rate, to set a date by
which the employer's workforce must be purged of the effects of past
unlawful discrimination, thus ending any continuing third party inju-
ries, and then invite the parties to propose a method for achieving that
goal. If no numerical remedy appears necessary to meet the deadline
set by the court, no such remedy should be used; a court should, how-
ever, monitor progress under whatever order it adopts in order to as-
certain whether stronger measures are required, or lesser measures will
suffice, to eliminate by the target date all effects of the proven violation.
F. Deterrence Orders
There are, as noted above, a number of situations in which it is not
possible to restore the actual victims to the positions they would have
occupied but for past discrimination. In some instances, particularly
involving discrimination in hiring or dismissals, the direct victim will
often no longer want the job that, for racial reasons, was given to a
white, because the delay between violation and remedy made another
position more secure or attractive. Some forms of discrimination may
so effectively obscure the identities of the original victims that it would
be impossible to delineate a class of likely victims. Where this is the
case, and no third parties are being injured by a past violation, there
may be cases in which no remedial purpose would be served by taking
affirmative steps to alter the racially tainted composition of an em-
ployer's workforce.
Where, however, an employer has engaged in systematic intentional
discrimination, be it in hiring, promotions or dismissals, affirmative
tion Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F. Supp. 101, 117 n.16
(D. Conn. 1979) (50% ratio rejected as too slow, 100% ratio for first 102 hires ordered), aff'd
in part and vacated in part, 641 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982); Louis-
ville Black Police Officers Org., 511 F. Supp. at 840 (33% ratio needed to reach desired level in
five years); Haynie v. Chupka, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 267, 270 (S.D. Ohio 1976)
(45% ratio required to reach desired level in five years); Crockett v. Green, 388 F. Supp. 912,
921 n.4 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (50% numerical remedy needed to reach desired level in six years,
defendants proposed 25% ratio unacceptable because it would require 12 years), aft'd, 534
F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976); Arnold v. Ballard, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 287, 289-90 (N.D.




measures are essential regardless of whether likely victims can be found
or want the positions in dispute. The purpose of systematic intentional
racial discrimination is by definition racial, not personal: to deny to all
blacks, not just to one individual who happened to be black, access to
particular positions or promotions. The ultimate goal of such discrimi-
nation is to assure that an entire workforce, or the workforce in certain
jobs, is either all white or as close to all white as-possible. At the least,
in the face of laws such as Title VII, racist employers seek to postpone
as long as possible the day when there will be a substantial number of
blacks in their plants or offices.
Whatever compensatory relief may be appropriate in a particular
case, a court faced with a practice of systematic intentional discrimina-
tion must adopt a decree that not only condemns that scheme, but as-
sures, insofar as is possible, that the scheme will not succeed. If the
courts, in the face of such systematic intentional discrimination, were
merely to forbid discrimination, employers would as a practical matter
be at liberty to postpone the effective date of Title VII from July 1,
1965 to whatever date the courts finally caught up with them. If, in the
face of such discrimination, the courts were merely to enjoin further
such discrimination and direct back pay awards for applicants who, due
to changed circumstances, no longer wanted thejobs at issue, Title VII
would no longer constitute a prohibition against racial discrimination,
but would be little more than a somewhat unpredictable system for li-
censing, at a fee, the practice of racial discrimination. Either of these
limited remedies leaves an employer or union with precisely the result
that it sought when it violated Title VII, an all-white workforce.
Such a consequence is intolerable because it rewards with success
the most vicious and systematic type of Title VII violation. Equally seri-
ously, were it the practice of courts to leave untouched the all-white
units created in this way, that promise of success would encourage em-
ployers and unions to engage in intentional discrimination. As a practi-
cal matter, ordinary rightful place relief is unworkable or meaningless
as a method of undoing the effects of certain types of Title VII viola-
tions. Thus an inevitable consequence of limiting redress to rightful
place relief would be to encourage employers to engage in those partic-
ular forms of intentional discrimination that tend to make rightful place
relief impracticable. An employer that wanted an all white supervisory
force, for example, would have good reason not to hire blacks at all,
rather than to refuse to promote blacks to supervisor, since victims of
promotion discrimination are likely to be all too ready to seek and use
rightful place relief, while victims of hiring discrimination often are not.
The purpose of Title VII is to end racial discrimination, not to cre-
ate a world in which both discrimination and litigation thrive. If an
employer who desires to create an all-white workforce is to be deterred
from doing so, the courts must adhere to a remedial approach that as-
sures that the intentional systematic exclusion of blacks will be not
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merely expensive, but also unsuccessful. Where none of the other con-
siderations discussed above, including rightful place relief, would war-
rant an order placing blacks in a particular job, such an order should
nonetheless be issued if an employer has systematically and intention-
ally excluded blacks from the positions at issue. That order must en-
sure that an employer who engages in such systematic discrimination
does not in fact succeed in ending up, after obeying that decree, with
substantially fewer blacks than an employer who chose from the outset
to obey the commands of Title VII itself. Adherence to this rule is es-
sential to deterring future intentional discrimination and to protecting
the individuals who would otherwise be the victims of such illegal
practices.
Judges have frequently observed that court ordered numerical rem-
edies are often offensive to an employer and its white employees. In
the case of intentional discrimination, however, any such offensiveness
actually augments the deterrent value of a numerical order. Numerical
orders are likely to be particularly distasteful to racist employers and
personnel officials; individuals who would like to give preferences to
white applicants will be particularly galled at having to give such prefer-
ences to blacks. The greater the prospect that systematic intentional
discrimination will ultimately provoke a court ordered hiring or promo-
tion remedy, the more likely that employers will think twice before en-
gaging in such discrimination.
III. FASHIONING NUMERICAL REMEDIES
To assert that there are a number of entirely legitimate and impor-
tant reasons why a court might order a numerical remedy is not to
claim that such remedies should be ordered in all cases, or that they
were necessarily warranted in every case in which they have been
awarded in the past. What this article proposes, rather, is a framework
for deciding whether a numerical remedy is appropriate in a particular
case, and a method of analysis under which that decision, and the pa-
rameters of any order that is approved, will turn on largely factual is-
sues. The essentially practical considerations which bear on the
appropriateness of these remedies are equally applicable whether a
court is enforcing Title VII, the fourteenth amendment, or some other
prohibition against racial discrimination.
The various types of numerical remedies which the courts have used
in Title VII cases are all entirely consistent with the principle that com-
pensatory relief be directed at the actual victims of discrimination. In
most instances the courts have used numerical remedies to prevent fu-
ture injuries to new actual victims, rather than merely to try to redress
those injuries after they have already occurred. In those instances
where numerical orders are included in a compensatory remedy, they
are used as part of a scheme whose very purpose is to identify actual
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victims of discrimination, and the sometimes unavoidable imprecision
in such remedial schemes is the result of the unlawful discrimination
that, often intentionally, tended to obscure the identities of those
victims.
Although there are a number of quite distinct circumstances in
which numerical remedies may and should be ordered in employment
discrimination litigation, in most cases the federal courts issuing such
decrees have failed to explain which particular legal principle they were
applying, or to make the specific factual findings which that rationale
required. Orders denying numerical remedies are generally equally
opaque. It may well be that many or even most of these decisions are
sound, but there is ordinarily no way a reader, or an appellate court,
can be certain that that is true.
Any court considering the issuance of a numerical remedy ought to
make clear precisely what remedial principles it is applying. Once a
court identifies the particular type of numerical remedy at issue, the
decision to grant or deny such an order will often turn largely on fac-
tual issues. An understanding of the distinctions among the various
rationales for court ordered numerical remedies will ordinarily suggest
in any particular case what facts are relevant in that case, and why. This
fact-intensive analysis will eliminate much of the apparently standar-
dless and at times misused judicial discretion in fashioning remedial
decrees. In light of the factual decision underlying a particular decree,
the court and parties will understand what future developments, if any,
might warrant a modification of that order.
If trial court decisions to grant or deny numerical remedies are
structured in this way, the role of the appellate courts will be both sim-
pler and narrower. Where a trial judge correctly understands the appli-
cable legal principles governing the circumstances and reasons for
granting or denying numerical remedies, the only question on appeal
will ordinarily be whether the lower court's factual findings were clearly
erroneous. 277 Supreme Court decisions make clear that the courts of
appeals have only limited authority to overturn such trial court findings
of fact. 2 78
The present confused state of the law has left the courts with virtu-
ally no meaningful standards for deciding whether to approve pro-
posed consent decrees containing some form of numerical remedy. In
the absence of any clear idea of why a court should order such a remedy
in a litigated case, judges understandably have been even more uncer-
tain about when in a settlement, a necessarily far more limited record,
such orders should be approved. In considering such a proposed order
in a consent decree, a court should ascertain the specific rationale on
277. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
278. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985); Pullman-Standard
v. Swint Co., 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
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which the remedy was sought by the plaintiffs. Once that rationale is
known, the settlement will represent a compromise of the particular
factual issues that would be relevant if the remedy were being sought in
a litigated case. A decision as to the reasonableness of such factual
compromise will be far easier to make, and review, than an exercise of
the sort of amorphous discretion that courts now use in considering
consent decrees.
Much of the theoretical opposition to numerical remedies has been
directed at "rigid" and "inflexible" "quotas" that must be met regard-
less of future developments and regardless of whether there are suffi-
cient numbers of qualified black applicants. In practice, however, many
court-ordered numerical remedies are expressly limited to qualified
blacks,2 79 contemplate alteration under specific circumstances, 280 or
simply contain an open ended invitation to the parties to seek subse-
quent modifications.28 1 More importantly, the district courts have fre-
quently altered numerical orders at the request of a party even though
the original decree did not expressly authorize such an alteration. 282
That practice reflects the readiness of federal judges to use their inher-
ent authority to modify any outstanding injunction, and the particular
willingness of those judges to consider such changes where a sensitive
problem like race conscious remedies is involved. Any numerical order
must be understood as authorizing, at least tacitly, future requests for
279. Justice Powell correctly regarded such a limitation as implicit in the order at issue
in Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3056-57; see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 911 n.32 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Bridgeport Guardians v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 354 F. Supp. 778, 799 (D.Conn.), aft'd in part and rev'd in part, 482 F.2d 1333
(2d Cir. 1973).
280. EEOC v. International Union of Elevator Constructors Local 5, 20 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 506, 508 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (order will be reconsidered if there are "undue difficul-
ties"); Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 488 F. Supp. 988
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (modification may be sought in light of 1980 census), aff'd, 648 F.2d 922 (3d
Cir. 1981); League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 410 F. Supp. at 911 n.32 (defendants can seek
modification "if insufficient qualified individuals apply").
281. United States v. New York, 475 F. Supp. 1103, 1109, (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (order will be
reconsidered in two years); Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1468, 1484
(E.D. Pa. 1974) (either party may move for modification of order after six months), appeal
dismissed, 530 F.2d 501 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 921 (1976);Jones v. Milwaukee County,
13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 307, 312 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (court will consider motion by
either party for corrective order); Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723, 736 (N.D. Ohio 1975)
(need for order will be reevaluated in three years); United States v. Lathers Local 46, 341 F.
Supp. 694, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (order subject to modification in light of "later experience"),
aft'd, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
282. United States v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d 1354, 1361 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(required promotion level reduced from 40% to 25% in light of substantial progress under
earlier order); Copeland v. Donovan, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 119, 119-20 (D.D.C.
1981) ("goals" modified due to drastic drop in available vacancies and in light of defendant's
good faith efforts); EEOC v. Bartenders Int'l Union Local 41, 28 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1575, 1577 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (mandated level of minority union members raised in light of
defendant's unexplained failure to achieve lesser goals); United States v. City of Philadelphia,
17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 167, 168 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (25% female hiring order suspended
due to lack of eligible women).
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modification. 283 Because the granting of an order necessarily depends
on factual findings, findings which frequently involve predictions about
future events, there is a clear and principled factual basis on which re-
quests for modification may be based and resolved.
Much of the heated debate about "quotas" has consisted of essen-
tially factual disputes masquerading as arguments about grand princi-
ples of morality. Federal courts may have no particular expertise
regarding social policy, but they are uniquely well-equipped to resolve
factual contentions. To assert that federal judges should not order nu-
merical remedies in employment cases is either to insist that Congress
never intended to permit full enforcement of Title VII, an argument
definitively rejected by Sheet Metal Workers', or to claim that every fed-
eral judge over the last twenty years who concluded that the use of a
numerical remedy was a practical necessity must have simply misunder-
stood the facts of the particular case he or she was deciding. The deci-
sion to order a numerical remedy in any specific case will be, and ought
to be, a troubling one, to be made with a degree of deliberation com-
mensurate with the sensitivity of the problem, but it is a decision to be
made by inquiring with care into the particular facts of that case, not by
relying on a priori asumptions that such remedies are never, or always,
necessary.
283. United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 234-35 (1969);
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 431,434 (Ist Cir. 1976) ("should experience demonstrate over
time that even the most diligent efforts fail to make demonstrable progress toward that [hir-
ing] goal, there will be adequate opportunity to request minority relief. Conversely, time may
indicate the goal to be too modest."); Arnold v. Ray, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 793, 797
(N.D. Ohio 1979) ("the Court's door is always open").
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